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Problem Statement:  Second victims are healthcare providers who are emotionally 
traumatized after experiencing an unanticipated adverse event.  To support second 
victims, organizations can provide a dedicated support program for their employees.  The 
scope of this study will include the perceptions of patient safety leaders on the concept of 
supporting second victims and on developing a second victim support program.   
Methods:  A literature review was conducted on second victims, the need for support 
programs, policy implications, the Malcolm Baldrige Criteria for Performance 
Excellence, stress disorder, and examples of second victim support programs in 
healthcare and in non-healthcare settings.  In-depth, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with 43 patient safety representatives from 38 acute hospitals in Maryland.  
Descriptive statistics were generated for both hospital and participant characteristics.  
Data were analyzed in the QSR NVivo10 software using a mixed-methods approach to 
generate codes and extract themes from the interviews 
Results: The response rate was 83%.  All participants believed that they and their 
executives were aware that the second victim problem exists.  Although participants 
varied in their perceptions of whether a second victim program would be helpful, all of 
the participants agreed that hospitals should offer organizational support programs for 
their own staff that become second victims.  Although some organizations are attempting 
to promote a ‘just culture’ in responding to events, there continues to be stigma attached 
with: (1) speaking up during a root-cause-analysis and (2) accessing support if it was 
 iii 
offered to employees.  There continue to be gaps in organizational services that are 
provided regarding timeliness of intervention.  Also, there is a need for peer support for 
both the second victim and for the individuals who provide support. Approximately 18% 
of the Maryland hospitals offer a second victim support program.  Details on the 
structure, accessibility, and outcomes for these programs are described. 
 
Conclusions: The second victim problem is recognized in all Maryland hospitals.  
However, providers face barriers in accessing them. Future efforts should assess the need 
for second victim programs from the perspectives of second victims themselves as well 
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The Institute of Medicine’s “To Err Is Human” report that revealed as many as 98,000 
deaths occur in the U.S. annually in healthcare due to medical errors
1
.  While patients and 
their families suffer from these incidents, health care providers can also be affected by 
the same events and are referred to as the “second victims”
2
.  In each of these cases, 
when the health care providers knew about the outcome, they were likely to be 
emotionally and/or physically impacted by the event.  Second victims experience short-
term feelings of anxiety, doubt, restlessness, fear—among other feelings.  In the short 
term, their performance may be impaired, posing a potential threat to the care of other 
patients.  In the longer term, some health care providers experience symptoms similar to 
those of post-traumatic stress syndrome, and may question their ability to take care of 
patients, quit their jobs, leave their professions, and in some cases even commit suicide
3
.  
If emotional distress is not mitigated properly, these health care providers can be 
impaired in their ability to delivery quality patient care.  
 
Although health care organizations often carefully evaluate system problems after an 
unanticipated patient-related event, little to no attention has been given to the caregivers 
that are involved.  An important way to understand the second victim problem and the 
adequacy of support structures is from the perspective of organizational leaders. Leaders 
are responsible for supporting their workers and can provide information on the needs 
and potential benefits of a second victim support program within their organizations.  
 2 
Although there are existing support programs to assist employees, such as employee 
assistance and wellness programs, there is no standard support program specifically 
tailored for second victims after adverse events.   
 
STUDY AIMS 
The overall goals of this study are to: (1) assess the perceived need by organizational 
patient safety leaders to implement a formal second victim support program, (2) 
determine the existing support services available to second victims nationally and 
internationally based on the literature, and (3) identify best-practices for second victim 
support programs currently provided by selected Maryland hospitals 
 
The specific study aims of this study are: 
Study Aim #1:  To review the literature on second victims, psychological trauma, and 
support interventions to treat second victims 
1.1:  To assess and quantify the prevalence of second victims in the literature  
1.2:  To describe the treatment of post-traumatic syndrome and the treatment of 
emotional trauma 
 
Study Aim #2:  To assess the perceptions of patient safety officers of the extent of the 
second victim problem in their organization, and the extent of support services available 
to second victims  
 3 
2.1:  To assess patient safety officers’ perceptions of the extent of the second 
victim problem in their organizations and impact of adverse events on second 
victims following an unanticipated adverse event 
2.2:  To assess patient safety officers’ role and/or attitudes in providing an 
organizational support structure for second victims seeking help after an adverse 
event  
2.3:  To identify existing peer support structures in Maryland hospitals and 
describe their structure 
2.4:  To identify and quantify the extent to which support structures are desired in 
Maryland hospitals 
 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY & RATIONALE FOR RESEARCH 
Since the issue of second victims is ubiquitous, the scope of this study will include the 
perceptions of organization patient safety leaders of the concept of second victims and on 
developing a support program to assist their colleagues and caregivers in their 
organization.  Organizational support for second victims is one facet of a comprehensive 
effort to establish a non-judgmental and just culture of safety within healthcare 
institutions
4
.  Although some institutions have developed their own programs, there is no 
standardized or exemplar, customizable second victim program for hospitals has yet to be 
developed.  Findings in this dissertation offer insights on beneficial features and services 
that can be incorporated into a second victim peer support program.  
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This study also builds on an ongoing peer-support effort for health care workers at the 
Johns Hopkins Hospital, referred to as the RISE team.  The Hopkins RISE team is 
collaborating with the Maryland Patient Safety Center to develop a state-wide program 
that can guide other hospitals to establish their own second victim support program.  This 
collaboration titled “Implementing a Peer Support Program at Your Organization” is 
focused on increasing awareness of the second victim problem in Maryland hospitals as 
well as training hospital representatives on how to develop and implement a second 
victim support structure within their organizations.  In assessing the perceptions of 
Maryland patient safety officers about implementing second victim support programs, 
this project will facilitate the execution and implementation of the collaboration. 
 
Furthermore, this study will have implications for policy changes as they relate to 
organizations that are interested in developing formal provider support structures for 
employees to access after an adverse event or medical error happens.  It is important to 
note that the United States Joint Commission is currently revising its sentinel events 
policy.  Within this policy, there is an emphasis on recommending that healthcare 
institutions recognize second victims’ needs and establish a support structure to assist 
them through coping with traumatic medical events
5
.  Most importantly, this study will 
assist organizations in deciding if and how support programs are beneficial in addressing 
second victims’ needs in acute care hospitals. 
 
 5 
This research study also has the potential to lead to indirect societal benefits in that 
implementing a support program will foster a healthier workforce that is functions 
consistently at a high level, and that delivers good quality of care.  The development of a 
standard support structure for employees and the evaluation of the perceptions of patient 




This dissertation is organized into five chapters, including two manuscripts and 
appendices.  The first chapter introduces the background, the study aims, and significance 
of the study and rationale for the research.  The second chapter presents a literature 
review on second victims, the need for support programs in healthcare, policy 
implications, the Malcolm Baldrige Criteria for Performance Excellence, acute stress 
reaction and post traumatic stress disorder, examples of second victim support programs 
in healthcare settings and examples of support programs in non-healthcare settings.  The 
third chapter (Manuscript #1: “Does One Size Fit All?  Assessing the Need for 
Organizational Second Victim Support Programs”) focuses on obtaining Maryland 
patient safety leaders’ perspectives on the extent of the second victim problem, the 
availability of emotional support services, and the need for organizational second victim 
support programs among acute care healthcare institutions in the State of Maryland.  The 
fourth chapter (Manuscript #2: “Do Maryland Hospitals Support Second Victims: 
Collective Insights from Patient Safety Leaders in Maryland Hospitals”) presents results 
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on the extent to which organizational second victim support is perceived as desirable by 
acute care hospitals in Maryland, the role of employee assistance programs in supporting 
second victims, and existing second victim support programs.  The final chapter describes 
a discussion of the findings from the three manuscripts and presents implications for 
policies and future research.  The appendices include the IRB decision letter, study 
recruitment materials, data collection forms and questionnaires. 
 
In summary, this research study will aim to address some of the gaps in the second victim 
literature related to second victim support programs.  The study captures the perceptions 
of patient safety leaders in Maryland hospitals in relation to assessing the extent of the 
second victim problem, desirability of support, and availability for support.  Additionally, 
the development and evaluation of a second victim support program within the Johns 





LITERATURE REVIEW & CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
This section provides an overview of aspects of the published literature relevant to the 
empirical work on the second victim described in this dissertation. 
 
I. DOMAINS OF THE LITERATURE  
A. Patient Harm & Second Victims 
Expectations run high in health care.  Too often, healthcare providers are expected to 
exemplify perfection when caring for patients
6
.   When patients are harmed rather than 
helped by health care, especially as a result of errors, both patients and their providers 
can be shocked and disappointed.  In fact, these injuries happen more frequently than 
imagined.  In 1999, the Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) “To Err Is Human” report indicated 
that as many as 98,000 Americans die in hospitals every year due to medical errors
7
.  As 
striking as this number is, these incidents typically involve more than one care provider.  
Care providers who are themselves emotionally traumatized by these incidents are 
referred to as the ‘second victims.’  Very few of these incidents are caused solely by 
individual errors.  In addition, individuals may be affected even if they were only 
witnesses to an incident.  A second victim is a healthcare provider who is emotionally 
traumatized after experiencing an unanticipated patient adverse event or other stressful 
patient-related event and has difficulty coping with his or her emotions; whereas the 
patient and family are considered to be the first victims
8
.   
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Second victims can suffer immensely on both a personal and professional level.  Not only 
can this negatively affect the healthcare provider, but it can also impact efforts to build a 
safer health system.  The term ‘second victim’ was coined by Dr. Albert Wu in 2000
8
.  
Since then, a growing number of studies have referenced second victims and described 
the impact of adverse events on healthcare providers.  Generally, second victims undergo 
a cascade of feelings, with short-term symptoms characteristics of acute stress reaction, 
and long-term signs and symptoms, similar to those experienced by individuals with post-





.  Other studies indicate that second victims reported emotions related 
to self-blame, self-doubt, anger, guilt, troubling memories, worry about being involved in 









.  Second victims also go through social withdrawal, isolation, and feel 




In addition to experiencing these feelings, second victims often feel personally 
responsible for the outcome, feel as if they have failed their patients, and second-guess 
their clinical skills
77
.  In some instances, second victims agonize about what their 
colleagues think, replay the sequence of events in their memory, and fear the 
consequences of speaking up to discuss the error
12
.  Due to this fear, some second victims 
suffer alone and do not voice their thoughts about the mistakes they have either 
contributed to or witnessed
13
.  As a result of not effectively coping with their emotions, 






B. Prevalence of Second Victims 







.  The study that concluded a rate of 
10.4% included otolaryngologists who described an error they were involved in during 
the past 6 months
15
.  A second study that reported a 30% prevalence of second victims in 
a sample of medical students, physicians, and nurses who reported personal problems 
related to anxiety, depression, and challenges in their ability to provide care during the 
past 12 months
78
.  In a third study, 43.3% of physicians, nurses, and pharmacists, and 
other healthcare professionals indicated that the error had a moderately severe or severe 





C. Impact of Error on Second Victims  
The occurrence of adverse events has an impact on the second victim, the healthcare 
team, and the organization.  As mentioned earlier, the second victim can develop clinical 
conditions, particularly acute stress reaction or PTSD.  To manage and treat these 
conditions in other situations outside of medical care, a variety of interventions have be 
offered based in part on the severity of the second victim’s response to the error.   
 
1. Clinical conditions: Acute Stress Reaction & Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
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Second victims who experienced a traumatic event often undergo signs and symptoms 
similar to those who develop PTSD.  According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders IV (DSM-IV-TR), traumatic events, such as injury or death, have the 
ability to trigger fear, horror, or helplessness in an individual
17
.  Individuals exposed to 
these types of events have an increased likelihood of developing posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD), depression, panic disorder, anxiety disorder, and substance abuse
18
.  
The diagnostic criteria for PTSD include
48
:  
A) Exposure to the traumatic event that includes both: (1) risk of serious injury or 
death and (2) a response to the event that encompasses fear or helplessness, 
B) Persistent re-experiencing of the event, 
C) Emotional numbing and persistent avoidance of stimuli or behaviors associated 
with the trauma, 
D) Repeated, increased arousal of physiological responses, such as startled 
responses, insomnia, anger, lack of concentration, 
E) Continuation of symptoms for more than one month, and 
F) Significant impairment to various domains of life activity, including social 
relations and occupational activities.  
 
Although PTSD was first recognized among military veterans, other traumatic events that 
can lead to PTSD involve interpersonal violence (i.e. rape, assault, and torture), exposure 
to life-threatening accidents (i.e. motor vehicle accidents, plane crashes, bombings) or 
natural disasters (i.e. floods, fires, earthquakes)
19
.  PTSD can also develop in individuals 
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who have witnessed unnatural death, violent harm, or injury and who have known that a 
loved one is in a similar situation
20
.  Many studies have shown that PTSD is associated 




.   
 
PTSD includes three types of symptoms: re-experiencing, avoidance, and hyper-
arousal
48
.  Re-experiencing symptoms include flashbacks in reliving the trauma, bad 
dreams, frightened thoughts; these can interfere with an individual’s daily routine.  
Words, objects, or similar situations can remind the individual of the event or trigger the 
experience.  Avoidance symptoms involve staying away from places, things or objects 
that remind the individual of the event.  Feelings of emotional numbness, guilt, worry, 
depression, and losing interest in activities that were enjoyable to the individual in the 
past are also symptoms of avoidance.  These types of symptoms are triggered by thoughts 
or objects that remind the individual of the event and may ultimately cause the individual 
to change his/her daily routine.  Finally, rather than being triggered, hyper-arousal 
symptoms are constant and can make individuals feel stressed, angry, tense, have 
difficulty sleeping, or difficulty performing daily tasks, such as eating, sleeping, or 
concentrating
23
.  It is common for individuals to experience some of these symptoms 
following a traumatic event.  However, some individuals experience severe symptoms 
that may last anywhere from a couple of weeks to one month; this is called acute stress 
disorder (ASD).  When these symptoms last for more than 3 months, this is defined as 
PTSD
,24, 48
.  ASD does not always lead to PTSD, but is associated with an increased risk 
of developing PTSD
25
.   
 12 
 
Research indicates that PTSD can also occur in individuals who witness traumatic events 
in the workplace, such as firefighters, ambulance service workers, emergency department 






.  There are some situations that increase the risk of 
PTSD, including seeing a dead body, or feeling that one is going to die.  Although the 
circumstance differ, this includes healthcare providers, who can experience physical and 
psychological distress, negative emotional responses, and impaired performance—all of 




.   
 
There are three main types of treatment for an individual with PTSD: counseling, 
medication, and/or referral to more comprehensive treatment.  Counseling includes 
supporting and educating the individual in a safe environment
50
.  An individual is 
referred to specialized treatment if initial treatments have not been effective or if patients 
experienced side effects from the medication
50
.  Even through brief cognitive behavioral 
therapy (CBT)—a psychotherapeutic approach that focuses on the relationship between 
thoughts, feelings and behaviors—may reduce symptoms in those who have ASD, there 
is limited evidence of best practices to treat individuals who have been exposed to a 
traumatic event
31
.   
 
In fact, the use of early interventions, their effectiveness, timeliness and mode of 
intervention continue to be debatable
55
.  Several studies, systematic reviews and meta-
analyses of studies with PTSD post-intervention include: (Group 1) interventions for 
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traumatic events irrespective of symptoms, (Group 2) interventions for traumatic events 
within 3 months after the event, and (Group 3) interventions for diagnosis of acute stress 
disorder or PTSD within 3 months after the event
50
.  Studies in Group 1 (n=8) indicate no 
significant differences between those who have received an intervention in comparison to 
those who have not.  Studies in Group 2 (n=15) convey no statistically significant 
differences between different interventions; however, there were statistically significant 
differences in favor of CBT-like interventions in comparison to no intervention or 
supportive counseling at post-treatment assessment.  Studies in Group 3 (n=11) also 
indicated statistically significant differences in favor of CBT-focused interventions.  
Although these studies included diverse interventions on various populations that ranged 
from 4-16 hours, results from these studies indicate that no specific intervention can be 
recommended for conventional use
55
.  These results are also consistent with the 
conclusions that were drawn from a recent systematic review on PTSD, where CBT was 
the preferable choice for reducing PTSD
47
.  This review also concluded that there lacks to 
be sufficient evidence to support the effectiveness of PTSD treatment interventions
47
.  
Therefore, future research should focus on exploring strategies to increase effectiveness 
of interventions, ideal time to offer the intervention, and length of the intervention. 
 
2. Stress Reactions & Distress 
Instead of experiencing PTSD-like symptoms, some second victims experience a stress 
reaction as a result of unanticipated adverse events.  According to the literature, stress is 
the body’s reaction to an environmental or external condition.  Stress differs from trauma 
 14 
in that stress is a reaction to external stimuli within the normal range of the human 
experience, whereas trauma is a life-threatening event that cannot be tackled with the 
usual coping strategies
32
.  As a result, the sympathetic nervous system is activated which 
then leads to the fight-or-flight response.   
 
Stress impacts an individual’s mental and physical well-being and can be described as a 
positive condition—eustress, or a negative condition—distress
33
.  Since eustress tends to 
be associated with positive qualities, there lacks to be necessary actions to mitigate this 
response.  However, minor distress can be identified, assessed, and monitored.  In severe 
cases, distress can lead to dysfunction, an individual’s inability to recognize and 







.   
 
3. Management & treatment of psychological care 
Initially described by Abraham Maslow in his Hierarchy of Needs, basic physiological 
needs, followed by safety needs, must be met in order to fulfill the higher level growth 
needs of: affection & support, self-esteem and self-actualization 
36
.  In an effort to 
support individuals who have experienced traumatic events, some professionals make the 
common mistake of targeting the higher levels of self-esteem and self-actualization.  
Rather, to address second victims’ needs, it is helpful to focus on the safety component 
instead of targeting the higher levels of the hierarchy.  One component of safety is the 
need to seek personal or physical safety, financial security, and health & well-being.  In 
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the absence of physical safety, individuals tend to experience symptoms related to PTSD.  
And when health & well-being are compromised, individuals tend to experience stress 
and are unable to function as they would in a usual manner.   
 
The management and treatment of psychological care varies based on the severity of the 
event.  The Continuum of Care is a model that draws a parallel between psychological 
care as it relates to medical and surgical care
34
.  In this model, the psychological care 
begins with psychological first aid, followed by crisis intervention, counseling, and 
psychotropic meds & psychotherapy; whereas the medical/surgical care starts with 
physical first aid, basic life support, advanced life support, and ends with medicine and 
surgery.   
 
This section will focus on the description of the Continuum of Care model for 
psychological care.  The first section of the Continuum includes psychological first aid 
(PFA).  PFA is a strategy used to immediately mitigate emotional distress in the 
aftermath of a disaster and will be emphasized in more detail later in this review.   
 
The next segment of the Continuum includes crisis intervention.  According to Caplan, a 
crisis is a response to a critical incident, trauma, or disaster where an individual’s routine 
coping mechanisms have been impaired or are in a state of dysfunction
37
.  Crisis 
intervention is defined as “the provision of emergency psychological care to victims as to 
assist those victims in returning to an adaptive level of functioning and to prevent or 
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mitigate the potential negative impact of psychological trauma”
38
.  Crisis intervention 
differs from counseling in that it encompasses the P-I-E principles—proximity, 
immediacy, and expectancy
39
.  Since there lacks to be a single standard model of crisis 
intervention, the principles of crisis intervention have been used by practitioners to 















These include: immediate intervention, stabilization, facilitation of understanding the 
event, concentration on problem-solving, and restoration of self-reliance
46
.  Critical 
Incidence Stress Management (CISM), is a comprehensive crisis intervention system that 
consists of multiple crisis intervention components; this will be discussed in greater detail 
later in this review. 
 
The third part of the Continuum of Care model includes counseling, a type of 
psychological intervention that offers personal support to helps patients and groups 
improve their mental health and wellness, and function better
47
.  The goal of supportive 
counseling is to allow an individual to reflect on his or her life situation in a setting where 
he or she is comfortable and is more likely to cope. 
 
The final segment of the Continuum of Care model is the use of psychotropic 
medications and psychotherapy to address individuals’ psychological needs.  Previous 
studies suggested that administering medications immediately after an individual 
experienced a traumatic event might prevent the development of ASD or PTSD
48
.  
Whereas other studies indicated that although medications have reduced PTSD 
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symptoms, efficacy in preventing the development of PTSD is not yet known
49
.  
Furthermore, existing guidelines lack specific recommendations for medications that 
prevent ASD or PTSD.  Additional literature suggests that there is limited evidence for 
the use of certain medications, particularly selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) 
and antidepressants, for individuals who have developed ASD; whereas there has been 
significant clinical evidence that suggests uptake of these medications for individuals 
who experience PTSD is promising
48
.  As a result, SSRIs have been considered to be the 
first choice of medications for PTSD treatment.  Another type of medication prescribed 
for individuals who have experienced PTSD are benzodiazepines.  However, due to the 
lack of efficacy in treating PTSD symptoms, benzodiazepines have not been 
recommended as a choice of treatment.  A few studies indicated that second-generation 
antipsychotic medications (i.e. olanzapine, quetiapine, and resperidone) might be 
beneficial treatments for some PTSD patients, whereas others might experience intense 
flashbacks of the event
48
.  Lastly, the anticonvulsant medications (i.e. divalproate, 





Psychotherapy is a therapeutic interaction between a trained professional and a patient or 
group of patients that aims to enhance the patients’ sense of his or her health and well-
being.  During this personal interaction, a psychiatrist, psychologist or other mental 
health provider (i.e. clinical social workers, licensed counselors, or trained practitioner) 
learns about the patients’ condition, feelings, and behaviors, so that they can recommend 
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and offer healthy coping skills.  Various techniques have been used to address patients’ 
needs including dialogue, communication (i.e. writing, artwork, music, or narrative 
story), relationship building, and behavior change.  The literature suggests a great deal of 
controversy in the effectiveness of psychotherapy interventions, where some studies 
indicated increase benefits in offering the therapy and others believed that treatment was 
ineffective 
51
.  To date, there lacks to be a study that compares the effectiveness of 
different psychotherapies with long follow-up times
52
.  Future studies in a more 
comprehensive database could potentially result in additional evidence. 
 
D. Impact of Error on the Organization and the Healthcare Team 
As mentioned previously, many of the signs and symptoms second victims experience are 
similar to those that lead to post-traumatic stress disorder, including feelings of 
helplessness, insomnia, doubt, fear, or anxiety
53
.  Often, these symptoms are not only 
experienced by one individual, but rather several members in a team of healthcare 
providers who either have taken care of the same affected patient or were impacted by the 
event due to their role on the unit or physical proximity of the event.  For both individuals 
and teams, these symptoms can negatively impact the provider-patient relationship and 
can lead to absenteeism, low morale, frustration, lack of concentration, or presenteeism
54
.  
Theoretically, if not managed effectively, organizations can face low employee 
satisfaction scores, malpractice suits, and threats to federal funding. 
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Although growing attention is being paid to improving systems to create safer health care 
and to the appropriate handling of patients and families harmed during the provision of 
medical care, there has been little attention to helping health care workers cope with 
adverse events.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that many healthcare organizations do not 
adequately recognize the needs of second victims, and often do not meet those needs after 
a stressful event has occurred
55
. In fact, some organizations are unaware of how to 
develop and implement a formal second victim support structure
56
. As such, prioritized 
organizational response following an adverse event should encompass three priorities: (1) 
patient and family, (2) the staff—especially those involved in the event, and (3) the 
organization
55
.   
 
Even though the term second victim was introduced 14 years ago, there remains a gap in 
the literature on effective strategies and support programs to assist second victims in 
coping with their emotions.  As noted earlier, a few studies further defined second 
victims and described the feelings they experienced, identified the prevalence of second 
victims, and described how second victims cope with their emotions.  Most, if not all, of 
the published literature focuses on a hospital or health system setting; this limits the 
generalizability of the results to other settings.   
 









.  Although a few studies have introduced solutions or 
interventions to support second victims, there is a gap in the literature on effective 
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strategies to assist these healthcare providers.  For instance, one study mentioned that 
although there are various sources of support for healthcare providers after experiencing a 
medical error, such as risk management support, critical incident stress management 
(CISM), litigation assistance programs, physician support groups, and employee 
assistance programs, there continue to be challenges in addressing these second victims’ 
needs.  One recommendation of this report was to fund counselors experienced in 
supporting second victims.  Encouraging open communication and allowing clinicians to 




.  Rebuilding second victims’ confidence by holding debriefings, hiring more staff to 
reduce the stress level on the unit, and offering continued employee assistance counseling 
was documented by one study
63
.  Another recommendation was to emphasize the 









.  Some studies emphasized the importance of constructive 
feedback and avoiding punitive action when managing the error and its impact on the 




; whereas other studies introduced tools for 




E. Programs: Proactive organizational support for second victims 
There has been a great deal of attention paid to patient safety and patient safety culture 
over the past decade.  Many system changes have been made related to disclosure, 
reporting, and patient safety
1
.  However, little attention has been given to make structural 
changes in hospital settings to support healthcare providers after an unanticipated event 
 21 
takes place.  Thus, it is critical to address the needs of healthcare providers in hospital 
settings so that they are able to provide quality care to their patients.   
 
After an unanticipated adverse event, healthcare workers benefit from receiving support 
in the workplace from peers in a “safe” environment and non-threatening manner.  In 
order for providers to feel supported by their hospitals and peers, one options is 
availability of an organizational support program.  The aim of these organizational 
support programs is to offer second victims an opportunity to cope in positive ways with 
their emotional distress.  Furthermore, the presence of such a program reinforces 
leadership’s commitment to caring for the healthcare providers, so that they in turn can 
care for the patient.  These programs can include professional counselors, mental health 
providers, and even clinicians—peers who are trained to provide support.  These trained 
peers can offer social, emotional, and instrumental support for health-related behavior 
change to reach emotional recovery
68
.   
 
Informal support, such as that provided by peers, however, is not always positive social 
support.  In fact, there are instances in which these informal networks may be detrimental 
to the individual in need of support.  For instance, a colleague without training in 
effective support or coaching may provide unintentionally negative feedback to the 
second victim, which may have further detrimental effects on the ability to cope with the 
event
69
.  A subconscious awareness of such risks could impede a healthcare worker’s 
willingness to disclose an adverse event, engage effectively with programs, or be able to 
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respond to future events
70
.  There are several reasons that these interactions may be 
harmful rather than supportive.  These include inadequate awareness by peers of 
appropriate things to say, lack of formal training in providing support, lack of 
organizational resources, and the lack of organizational policy.  In other cases, supervisor 
involvement in providing support can pose a risk to the employee, such as an impact on 
annual evaluations.  In addition, informal support may not be equally accessible to all.  
Although some healthcare organizations may not have implemented formal second victim 
support programs, they may have employee assistance programs.  However, these 
programs may not have the capability to support second victims in a timely way 
following an unanticipated adverse event.  For these reasons, trained peers who provide 
support in a formal organizational support program can be an effective and sustainable 
strategy for healthcare institutions to consider.   
 
F. Second Victims and Employee Assistance Programs (EAPs)71 
Generally, hospitals in the United States have experience in providing immediate, 
confidential, and proactive services to employees in need of support.  These services can 
include employee assistance programs (EAPs) to staff who are experiencing personal 
issues that negatively impact their job performance.  Employee assistance programs 
(EAPs) were introduced in the 1940s to offer employee services on the affect of alcohol 
use and abuse on job performance.  Three decades later, EAPs broadened their scope of 
services to include personal issues that negatively impact employees’ job performance as 
well as issues that could lead to violence, physical and mental health problems in the 
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workplace.  EAPs provide value to the organization because they: (1) emphasize the 
value of the workforce, (2) address the organizations’ costs by reducing absenteeism and 
lowering employee turnover, and (3) mitigate business risks by reducing the likelihood of 
workplace violence, for instance.  Current EAPs are either offered by external 
(independent, hospital-based/stand-alone organization or health plan/managed care) or 
internal services (vendor-contracted services or staff provided services).  Depending on 
the organization, EAPs can be housed under Human Resources, Employee Benefits, 
Occupational Health, or the Medical Department. 
 
Regardless of how EAPs services are structured, they generally offer similar services that 
include: identifying, referring, and providing care to employees, providing online 
education and self-help materials, referring employees to Human Resources, and training 
employees and providing leadership.  Additional services offered by EAPs include 
critical incident stress management, workplace violence consultation, work/life support, 
financial/legal counseling, plan for work return, and onsite wellness programs.   
 
One of the challenges that EAPs face is the lack of standardization in the type and 
training of professionals selected to provide support and lead EAPs.  Additionally, the 
employee assistance field has not sufficiently published evidence to address the validity 
or impact of EAP models.  As a result, many of these programs are assessed within the 
organization through process or outcome measures that are reported to employers. 
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Even though the scope of these services is broad, EAP services can be limited in 
addressing second victims’ need since EAP counselors do not have specific experience in 
supporting second victims’ emotional suffering, and EAP services are limited in 
availability during night and weekend shifts
72
.  It is important for healthcare 
organizations to consider how to protect and invest in their human capital by offering 
services that will enhance healthcare providers’ job performance and address issues that 
negatively impact the workplace. 
 
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: Malcolm Baldrige Criteria for Performance 
Excellence Framework—A Strategy for Change 
No existing conceptual framework describes patient safety officers’ or leadership 
perceptions on the impact of adverse events on second victims, the importance of second 
victim support structures, and the impact of adverse events on clinical and provider 
outcomes.  Therefore, the Malcolm Baldrige Health Care Criteria for Performance 
Excellence framework was used to describe the relationship between patient safety 
officer perceptions (leadership domain) and second victims (workforce focus domain) 
and how the impact on organizational success. 
 
The Malcolm Baldrige Health Care Criteria for Performance Excellence framework 
provides a platform to focus organizational leadership efforts on a specific strategic 
priority while aiming to achieve and sustain the highest levels of excellence in quality, 
cost, financial stability, and employee satisfaction
73
.  This framework organizes the 
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following concepts into seven main sections: leadership, strategy, patient relations, 
worker relations, information management, operations, and results.  In highlighting these 
seven sections, the Baldrige framework advocates for organizational excellence through 
assessment, feedback and evaluation, and sharing of best practices.  In this study, the 
strategic priority will be focused on support programs and services for second victims, 
which as an effort that will enhance patient safety within the organization and sustain this 
priority over time. 
 
Significance of Baldrige Framework to Research Study: 
The Baldrige framework provides a conceptual foundation for the current the research 
study in that the study aims will address the “Leadership” and “Workforce Focus” 
domains.  Focusing on these domains will impact the remaining domains in the 
framework.  For instance, obtaining leadership support for implementing a support 
system within a hospital will be incorporated into the “Strategic Plan,” which will 
ultimately impact the “customer focus,” “process management,” “measurement and 
analysis,” and “results” domains.  
 
Organizational Profile:  
The organizational profile provides a snapshot of the organization’s environment, 








According to the Baldrige framework, leadership is defined by how senior leaders 
address values, directions, and performance expectations while focusing on patients and 
stakeholders, empowerment, innovation, governance, learning, and the community
74
.  
Within this framework, leaders must effectively communicate organizational values and 
performance expectations.  This is done by: 
1. Effectively describing the organization’s mission, vision, and values statements to 
employees and the public as well as clearly communicating these in proposing 
organizational change. 
2. Utilizing measures and benchmarks and reporting them to employees promptly 
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and publicly. 
3. Using the measurement system to reinforce a two-way communication with senior 
executives and employees.  This will create a culture in which employees are 
empowered to communicate with leadership and share their concerns. 
4. Recruiting and retaining effective team members by monitoring satisfaction, 
turnover, and safety.  Senior executives generally conduct formal and informal 
forums and walking rounds to reinforce this.  For instance, the “service value chain” 
concept—satisfied workers produce satisfied customers and improved clinical 
performance—has been embraced by many organizations. 
5. Utilizing financial incentives to reward goal achievement, recognizing employees, 
and celebrating their accomplishments. 
Additionally, senior executives who embrace the Baldrige leadership criterion create an 
environment that cultivates legal and ethical behaviors.  Leaders implement compliance 
processes and create effective relationships with employees to prevent legal violations.  
More importantly, organizational values are incorporated into these compliance processes 
to reinforce the importance of ethical behaviors. 
 
In this study, patient safety officers will represent leaders/senior executives in Baldrige’s 
leadership domain.  In order to develop and establish a comprehensive and systematic 
second victim support structure, it is critical to consider leadership’s perspective in 
implementing this organizational structure.  Therefore, conducting this study will help 
inform organizations on the importance of supporting healthcare providers. 
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2. Strategic Planning 
Strategic Planning reflects how an organization creates strategic objectives and action 
plans and how these are implemented, measured, and monitored.  It is critical for 
organizations to embed goals, empowerment, analysis, and revision into the culture.  
Most importantly, the strategic process is about how these components might change and 
become altered based on organizational priorities.  The strategic planning process begins 
with a review of the mission, vision, and values to update these and to reinforce them as 
core organizational criteria to guide strategy.  Then, organizational strengths, threats, and 
opportunities presented by new technologies, the dynamic market, caregivers, 
competitors, and regulators are evaluated; appropriate strategic responses are taken based 
on these assessments.  Additionally, goals and benchmarks are established, and specific 
task forces are created to monitor performance and set expectations.  Finally, employees 
are empowered to help build these plans and set targets to achieve organizational goals. 
 
3. Customer Focus 
This criterion allows organizations to develop requirements and expectations based on 
the preference of patients, key stakeholders, and surrounding markets.  As a result of 
being customer focused, organizations will be able to concentrate of satisfaction, loyalty, 
retention, and service expansion.  Some of the customers in these healthcare 
organizations include patients, families, providers, students, insurers, the community, and 
government agencies.  In order to be a customer-oriented organization, it is essential to: 
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1. Establish a comprehensive system of “listening and learning tools” through 
the use of focus groups, community need surveys, patient and employee 
satisfaction surveys, and market research. 
2. Determine opportunities for enhancing and improving service and clinical 
quality. 
3. Assess performance to determine what contributes to patient loyalty and 
provider loyalty. 
4. Address customer complaints immediately with a standardized process of 
response, monitoring, following up, and learning from system defects. 
5. Celebrate customer achievements by rewarding them with written 
acknowledgements, gifts, awards, etc.   
6. Build customer relationships and learn about maintaining customer loyalty 
from leading non-healthcare institutions. 
 
4. Workforce Focus 
This criterion emphasizes how organizations’ staff learning and motivation encourage 
them to utilize their full potential and maintain an effective work environment that 
reflects performance excellence, personal growth, and organizational success.  Since 
human resource practices are a significant aspect of the Baldrige framework, 
organizations fulfilling this criterion attract and retain competent and satisfied employees 
and aim to continuously improve their skills.  As a result, organizations develop their 
work environment by aligning providers’ expertise and experience with the 
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organizations’ overall strategy.  Furthermore, these organizations: 
1. Select and retain good employees 
2. Develop human resources systems that embrace high performance 
3. Articulate organizational learning and adaptation to change 
4. Continuously enhance employees’ well-being, satisfaction, benefits, and 
workplace safety.  
5. Advocate for the recruitment and retention of a diverse workforce 
Additionally, this research study will focus on the workforce and how the second victim 
support structures will assist providers in effectively coping with their emotions.  Asking 
patient safety officers on their perceptions of how employee assistance programs can 
support providers is also a critical component of Baldrige’s workforce focus domain.  
Overall, establishing a support structure for second victims will further enhance provider 
performance in offering quality care. 
 
5. Measurement, Analysis, and Knowledge Management 
This criterion focuses on how organizations select, collect, analyze, improve, and monitor 
data and information.  The “measurement and analysis” component examines input, 
verification, standardization, archiving, and analysis of large volumes of data from 
multiple sources; whereas “knowledge management” focuses on how organizations 
ensure availability of high quality and timely data. 
 
In order to focus on “measurement and analysis,” organizations develop, maintain, and 
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use data to improve performance.  This includes building medical-records coding and 
data, billing, materials management, cost accounting, satisfaction surveys, and human 
resources effectively and reliably.  Additionally, benchmarks are established and are 
compared to best practice.  Internal consultants are provided to employees to assist them 
in establishing relationships between measures, identifying trends, and preparing reports.  
Furthermore, involving management and employees in improving data processing and 
selection of measures is key.  
 
“Knowledge management” focuses on how organizations secure the availability of timely 
and high quality data.  Therefore, organizations should build the process management and 
business capabilities before implementing clinical information systems or electronic 
medical records.  They should also leverage providers’ use of technology when providing 
care.  Most importantly, these organizations emphasize the importance of error reporting 
while taking into consideration data confidentiality and HIPAA (Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act) compliance. 
 
6. Process Management 
Process management concentrates on the organizations’ clinical, business, and other 
support processes for establishing organizational value.  According to the Baldrige 
framework, organizations are a large set of work processes, where each process is 
described and monitored by performance measures that encompass availability, cost, 
quality, customer satisfaction, and employee satisfaction.  The elements in the strategic 
 32 
planning criterion, such as benchmarks, goals, and stakeholder opinions, are utilized to 
identify opportunities for improvement.  In general, process management programs: 
1. Alter and change the organizational culture from professional judgment to 
performance measurement 
2. Emphasize accountability around a group of patients with similar needs and 
services rather than a silo approach in service line structures  
3. Decide on performance measures and progress based on predetermined 
benchmarks and goals. 
4. Change and revise processes as well as search for alternatives based on 
analysis of quantitative and qualitative data 
5. Listen to and obtain qualitative information from key stakeholders, including 
customers and employees, to supplement quantitative measures and data 
already being collected. 
 
7. Results 
This criterion refers to performance and improvement in relation to competitors who are 
providing similar health care services.  There are currently few studies that can provide 
this information for the second victim problem. 
 
III. EXAMPLES OF SECOND VICTIM OR SUPPORT PROGRAMS  
 
A. Support Programs for Hospital Workforce 
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A few support programs have been cited in the literature and focus on offering timely 
interventions to support second victims.   
 
1. Medically Induced Trauma Support Services (MITSS) 
MITSS is a non-profit organization that aims to promote awareness to patients, family 
members, and clinicians on the emotional trauma that occurs after an unexpected medical 
outcome
75
.  Linda Kenney, a patient who was injured by an anesthesia-related adverse 
event, founded the institution in 2002.  After Linda’s recovery, she collaborated with the 
physician involved in her incident to establish MITSS as a resource center for both 
patients and healthcare providers who are emotionally traumatized and are having 
difficulty coping with events.  A MITSS invitation forum that took place in March 2009 
advocated for the need to develop organizational peer support programs, which will 
ultimately result in better communication, increased staff satisfaction, and an increased 
willingness to report errors
75
.  In addition to hosting annual events and workshops, 
MITSS developed a toolkit of resources to assist organizations in establishing second 
victim programs
76




2. University of Missouri: forYOU Program 
The University of Missouri Health Care (UMHC) is a 307-bed acute care hospital located 
in Columbia, Missouri.  The Office of Clinical Effectiveness (OCE) at UMHC realized 
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that during several event investigations, many healthcare providers personally suffered 
after experiencing an unanticipated adverse event.  In an effort to quantify the prevalence 
of second victims among care providers within the health system, an internal patient 
safety culture survey was administered in 2007.  Approximately, one in seven staff 
mentioned that they personally suffered as a result of a patient safety event, and almost 
70% of these individuals did not receive organizational support
77
.   
 
After conducting interviews with second victims (including physicians, registered nurses, 
and other professionals) at UMHC, OCE was able to identify six stages of the recovery 
trajectory that second victims encounter.  These include:  (1) chaos and accident 
response, (2) intrusive reflections, (3) restoring personal integrity, (4) enduring the 





In an effort to support these second victims from an organizational perspective, UMHC 
then developed the forYOU Program under the patient safety department to address 
second victims’ needs
78
.  To plan the scope of the program, the forYOU program 
established the Scott Three-Tiered Interventional Model of Second Victim Support
78
.  
This model focuses on the nature of support that escalates from support at the unit level 
from colleagues and supervisors (Tier 1), to support from trained peer supporters and 
patient safety officers (Tier 2), and ending at referrals to existing resources—EAP, 
chaplain, social work, or clinical psychologists (Tier 3)
78
.  A multidisciplinary group of 
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50 healthcare professionals across the academic health system, including the Schools of 
Medicine and Nursing, have undergone training to provide second victim support within 
their divisions.  The forYOU team meets monthly for ongoing program development, 
case reflection and training. 
 
3. Kaiser Permanente Program 
Kaiser Permanente, the largest US integrated health system located in California, realized 
that one of the barriers to reaching out for support is the stigma associated with accessing 
formal support through EAP
79
.  As a result, Kaiser established a clinician support 
program in 2004, which is housed under the EAP and aims to support the organization’s 
providers and staff members
75
. Senior leadership’s commitment to developing and 
sustaining a healthy workforce reinforces the existence of the program.  In addition, 
Kaiser’s EAP provides specific assistance programs for physicians and nurses with peer 
support by offering guidance, debriefing, counseling, referral, and recommendations for 
additional services, such as the organization’s chaplain and social services; the hope is 
that this will ultimately assist in reducing errors, increasing productivity, and embracing a 
culture of trust
75
.  The program also aligns with California’s state mandate to address 
physicians’ well-being.  After an adverse event happens, Kaiser’s Situation Management 
Team coordinates the response process and contacts EAP.  As the Situation Management 
Team coordinates a meeting time with the staff, EAP gathers additional information 
before interacting with staff, so that they are able to effectively provide support based 
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within the context of the event.  Then, both the EAP and the Situation Management Team 
assess the impact on the staff and offer appropriate interventions and follow-up.  
 
4. Boston Children’s Hospital: The Office of Clinician Support (OCS) 
The Office of Clinician Support (OCS) at the 395-licensed bed Boston Children’s 
Hospital in Massachusetts is a complimentary service that can be accessed by clinicians 
who have trouble coping with work-related or personal events
75
.  In 2004, the program 
was established based on pre-existing program and was led by a physiatrist-in-chief and 
chairman of psychiatry at Children’s.  Prior to 2004, the program started when a 
consulting psychiatrist to the medical service was offering support to groups and 
individuals outside his role.  Then, the hospital decided to create an Office of Physician 
Support, which later evolved into OCS.   
 
The OCS believes that clinician stress and burnout compromise patient care and patient 
safety.  As a result, they offer resilience training to decrease stress.  After an adverse 
event had been reported, the OCS works collaboratively with the EAP, the quality and 
patient safety departments, legal, other hospital departments, and different peer support 
services.  The OCS recognizes the “re-traumatizing” effect the debriefing and 
investigation processes have on staff and believe that reliving the event may lead to post-
traumatic stress response
75
.  Therefore, the OCS emphasizes the importance of peer 
support and the power of story telling and exchanging experiences that will ultimately 




5. Brigham and Women’s Hospital (BWH): The Center for Professionalism and 
Peer Support (CPPS) 
BWH is a 793-bed teaching hospital of Harvard Medical School in Boston.  In 2008, the 
Center for Professionalism and Peer Support at BWH was established to develop and 
maintain a culture of trust and respect among healthcare providers, patients, and 
families
80
.  The CPPS realized that the existence of unprofessional or disruptive behavior 
in the workplace negatively impacted teamwork, communication, and patient safety.  As 
a result, the Center created several programs that establish behavioral expectations and 
manage unprofessionalism, including: the professionalism initiative, disclosure and 
apology process, peer support, defendant support, and wellness programs.   
 
The leadership team at BWH partnered with an employment law educational company to 
develop an educational program that raised awareness and educated physicians (and later 
included other providers, such as nurse practitioners and physician assistants) on the 
importance of professional behavior; this evolved into a required educational program.  
The leadership team also established a Code of Conduct that emphasized professionalism 
and commitment to colleagues, patients, and families.  Furthermore, CPPS created a 
process for managing professionalism concerns that include: (1) intake and 
acknowledgement of professionalism concerns, (2) assessment process, and (3) 
remediation and monitoring
80
.  To address these concerns, different interventions, such as 
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feedback, coaching, formal evaluation, and 360-evaluation, were used based on the type, 
severity, and frequency of the behavior that was reported. 
 
6. Johns Hopkins Hospital: RISE (Resilience In Stressful Events) Program  
The RISE team at Johns Hopkins is a second victim peer support program created to 
assist second victims who are emotionally affected by disturbing patient related events
81
.  
The RISE program has been in existence for 2-3 years and is led by a program director.  
This peer support group is composed of Hopkins employees who are trained to provide 
support, including clinicians, professional counselors and mental health professionals, 
social workers, clergy, administrators, risk managers, and employee assistance program 
(EAP) staff.  RISE is mostly based on volunteer effort from existing personnel and is 
partially funded by the facility through the Patient Safety Department.   
 
Support is designed to be confidential and anonymous and is prepared to respond to 
groups as well as individuals.  The RISE team can be accessed 24 hours a day, 7 days a 
week if the employee requests it, if a unit manager or risk manager refer the employee, or 
if a peer recommends it to the second victim.  Some of the barriers to accessing support at 
the Johns Hopkins Hospital is taking time away from work to access the RISE team, not 
being aware that this program exists, and having concerns about being negatively judged 




B. Support Programs for Psychological Trauma 
 
1. Psychological First Aid (PFA) & RAPID-PFA 
Another intervention that aims to immediately mitigate emotional distress during or after 
a crisis is Psychological First Aid (PFA)—“the provision of a supportive and 
compassionate presence designed to enhance natural resilience and coping, while 




.  PFA was co-developed in 2006 
by the National Center for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, a division of the United States 
Department of Veterans Affairs, and the National Child Traumatic Stress Network as a 
technique used to assist individuals in the immediate aftermath of a disaster and to reduce 
the occurrence of PTSD
83
.   
 
PFA is based on the concept that disaster survivors will undergo various early reactions 
to the disaster, including physical, psychological, behavioral, and spiritual reactions.  
Since these reactions will impact an individual’s ability to recover, effectively coping 
with these reactions can be supported by those trained in PFA
83
.  The goals of PFA are 
similar to that of physical first aid in basic life support: stabilize psychological and 
behavioral functioning, mitigate psychological distress and dysfunction, facilitate 
recovery and return to adaptive psychological and behavioral functioning, and promote 




.  Evidence suggests that utilizing PFA as early as 
possible is essential following a traumatic event
86
.  However, specific time windows have 
not been determined. 
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In the literature, PFA has been recommended to serve as one element of a larger and 
more comprehensive mental health care intervention for traumatized individuals.  It was 
initially intended to help children, adolescents, adults, and families promptly after the 
occurrence of a disaster or terrorism events.  Since the purpose of PFA is to provide 
primary prevention of the acute and chronic stress reactions listed earlier, PFA training 
has been offered in various settings, including the American Red Cross, the World Health 
Organization, and the National Center for PTSD
87
.  Professionals who offer PFA in these 
settings include and are not limited to mental health and other disaster response workers, 
incident command systems, healthcare providers, school crisis response teams, faith-
based organizations, and disaster relief organizations.  Furthermore, specialized PFA 
curricula have been customized for individuals working in nursing homes, with the 
homeless, faith community leaders, and public health workers.   
 
PFA is also applicable to health care settings.  Given that healthcare providers have 
constant and direct contact with patients, they are more likely to encounter stressful 
traumatic events.  Many organizations do not have the capacity or capability to address 
each of these individuals’ needs, it is essential to build capacity and resilience within the 
hospital by offering PFA training to frontline health care providers
64
.  In doing so, 
clinicians will be able to assist their colleagues to mitigate emotional distress following 
the event.  Using PFA as an intervention will allow healthcare providers to recognize and 
identify second victims, offer timely support, and escalate the care if needed.  In order to 
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be effective, these elements should be supported by a foundation of organizational 
leadership support, infrastructure, training, and available resources. 
 
To increase utilization of PFA among individuals with no mental health training, 
including healthcare providers, the Johns Hopkins Center for Public Health Preparedness 
developed the related RAPID-PFA model (Reflective listening, Assessment, 
Prioritization, Intervention, & Disposition).  RAPID-PFA is based on a one-day training 
session that emphasizes the importance of communication, basic assessment and triage, 
and stress management
88
.   
 
 
2. Critical Incident Stress Management Debriefing (CISM) 
Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) is a widely used model that focuses on the 
importance of ‘psychological debriefing,’ which includes various short term interventions 




.  The large 
literature on CISM is based on a multi-disciplinary approach and is inclusive of the 
following fields and populations: nursing, fire services, police, social work, emergency 
preparedness, and allied health professions.  In utilizing the CISM model, timing is 
critical and should be offered in a group ideally within 24-48 hours of the event, since 





Numerous studies that have utilized CISM reported that it was a valuable experience that 
improved outcomes
101
.  CISM has also been reported to work effectively with emergency 
service personnel, civilians, and high-risk occupational groups.  Some studies indicated 
the importance of a skilled facilitator who is well-trained, supportive and is 
knowledgeable on the context and type of environments the victims work in
101
.  Other 
researchers have found additional benefits in utilizing the CISM model, such as 
emotional ventilation, support, stress management, positive coping, reassurance, and 






On the other hand, some researchers have found that in certain cases, critical incident 
stress debriefing has been harmful to participants.  The conclusion has been drawn that 
debriefing facilitators should not force individuals to reveal the details of the traumatic 
event as this may cause additional harm
93
.  Also, the lack of clarity of terminology and 
application of CISM has limited the successful measurement of psychological debriefing 
in the literature.  Some of these limitations include small sample sizes, absence of control 





.  As a result, further research is required to evaluate the 
effectiveness of CISM in various contexts, settings, and populations. 
 
The timing of CISM interventions has also been a point of debate in the literature
96
.  For 




; whereas others refer to 
early interventions taking place within 3 months of the traumatic event.  Other authors 
 43 
consider early support that happens immediately following an incident, before the 





.  Given the limited literature on the timing of CISM interventions in 
healthcare, one study assessed CISM interventions on stress reaction and employees 
perception of the intervention for those received support 24 hours or less after the 
incident occurred compared to those who received support more than 24 hours after the 
event
96
.  Results indicated that overall, those who received support within the first 24 




Even though many organizations offer different forms of psychological interventions to 
their employees, the cost of establishing a comprehensive CISM program can be 
substantial—as this requires human and organizational resources.  As a result, employee 
assistance programs in healthcare have been responsible for assessing traumatized 
employees
100
.  According to the literature, another alternative to offering a CISM 
program includes ‘defusing’ the situation and offering ‘peer support’—both of which are 
cost-effective compared to a formal debriefing intervention
101
.   
 
3. Support programs for those in the military 
Recent events have led to increasing attention has been given to the mental health status 
of military personnel exposed to deployment-related stressors or traumatizing events, e.g. 
Fort Hood and similar events.  As mentioned earlier, these types of events, including 
death and serious injury, provoke an individual or group to experience intense feelings of 
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horror, terror, or helplessness
10
.  The armed forces think that offering professional mental 
health services to service members to restore individual functioning and unit cohesion 
and clarify misconceptions is mission critical. 
 
Given that half of the service members who return with PTSD or depression-related 
symptoms seek mental health services, there continues to be stigma associated with 
confidentiality in accessing these services
102
.  In an effort to reduce these barriers, the 
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates introduced a policy in 2008 to make changes to the 
government security-clearance form
102
.  Regardless of the policy changes that were 
implemented, cultural knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs on seeking mental health services 
continue to be a challenge for many service members
103
.   
 
Additional efforts from leadership could have significant impact in creating a culture that 
is more likely to accept and recognize psychological health problems
102
.  One approach is 
to promote resilience, “the capacity to adapt successfully in the presence of risk and 
adversity,
104
” by enhancing military personnel’s strengths, such as physical fitness and 
stress reduction
102
.  In fact, frontline and medical leaders in the Defense Centers of 
Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury (DCoE) Resilience 
Program have emphasized the importance of resilience in their approach to operational 





Based on the literature, there are at least 77 resilience programs that target various 
audiences and resilience content (i.e. mental, social, physical, or spiritual focuses), some 
of which include military-specific programs.  Many of these programs focus on one or 
more intrinsic (i.e. individual) or extrinsic (i.e. family, unit, and community) factors, 
where each of these resilience factors incorporates strategies and concepts that will assist 
leaders in identifying the appropriate program for military personnel to access:  
 
Table 1:  Resilience Factors (modified from ‘Summary of Resilience Factors 




Individual Positive coping, positive affect, positive thinking, realism, 
behavioral control, physical fitness, altruism 
Family 
Emotional ties, communication, support, closeness, nurturing, 
adaptability  
Unit 
Positive command climate, teamwork, cohesion 
Community 
Belongingness, cohesion, connectedness, collective efficacy 
 
Moreover, these factors are embedded in some of the military-specific programs, which 
also include various group psychological debriefings.  Group debriefings, structured 
group discussions to reflect on a stressful event, are one of the most common and early 
interventions used in the military
105
.  The earliest type of group debriefing is Marshall’s 
World War II Historical Group Debriefing (HGB) used to clarify misconceptions and 
enhance teamwork
106
.  As a result, the military continued to offer unit-based debriefings, 
some of which include Leader-Led After-Action Debriefing (AAD), Critical Event 
Debriefing (CED), Time-Driven Battlemind Psychological Debriefing, and Critical 
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Incident Stress Management Debriefing (CISM).  Earlier in this review, CISM debriefing 
was explored.  Although debriefing has been found to be ineffective in reducing the 




Barriers to implementing resilience programs in the military include lack of leadership, 
challenges with logistics, funding, poor fit within the military, and mental health 
stigma
102
.  Recommendations for further work on resilience include the development of 
standardized resilience measures that can be applied to populations in various settings as 
they relate to the most effective resilience factors and strategies conveyed in the 
literature
102
.  Moreover, policy recommendations include standardizing the definition of 
resilience, integrating resilience into existing military programs, and conducting 
systematic program evaluation methods.  
 
 
G. Resource Allocation & Policy Implications 
 
1. Public Health and Hospital Practice 
This study has future implications for practice on both the system and individual levels 
since it focuses on strengthening health system delivery.  The system level approach 
includes organizational leadership commitment to develop, implement, and encourage the 
utilization of second victim support programs among the healthcare workforce.  This was 
also indicated earlier in the overview of the Baldrige framework.  Not only will this 
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promote a culture of safety within the hospital, but it will also reinforce the importance of 
leadership support for those who are working at the individual level to raise awareness of 
the second victim problem and support those in need. 
 
At the individual level, it is essential to adopt the component PFA Competency Set 1.0, a 
proposed national standard of behavioral skills that assist individuals in responding to 





.  This competency set was developed as a result of a specific 
mandate in the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006 to establish a 
competency-based program to train public health professionals in public health 
preparedness
108
.  Although some of these PFA competencies have been previously 
described in the literature, this recent competency set is consensus-based, empirically 
supported, and includes the knowledge, skills, and attitudes core competencies as they 
relate to each of the six PFA domains
82
.  These domains are: (1) initial contact, rapport 
building and stabilization, (2) brief assessment and triage, (3) intervention, (4) triage, (5) 
referral liaison, and advocacy, and (6) self-awareness and self-care.  Furthermore, these 
competencies have been developed under the guidance of the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention and the Association of Schools of Public Health
87
.   
 
The establishment of this competency set resulted in the creation of a 5-category logic 
model that can be utilized as a framework for future work
109
: 
1. Input:  Review and incorporate feedback from key stakeholders, 
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2. Activities:  Evaluate the competency set with end users, 
3. Outputs: Develop tools and resources, such as tools and manuals, to support 
PFA trainees, 
4. Outcomes: Collect data on knowledge of PFA trainees on competencies 
taught, and 




2. The Joint Commission Sentinel Event Policy 
The Joint Commission first established its Sentinel Event Policy in 1995, which aimed to 
outline how organizations should respond to sentinel events
110
.  Sentinel events are 
defined as “an unexpected occurrence involving death or serious physical or 
psychological injury, or the risk thereof.
111
”  Additionally, accredited organizations that 
report a sentinel event were required to conduct a comprehensive and timely root-cause-
analysis, create an action plan, and monitor process changes.  A criticism of current 
practice is that it tends to be insensitive to the needs of the second victim
69
.   
 
Due in part to these concerns the Joint Commission is in the process of revising their 
Sentinel Event Policy to include ideal characteristics for a hospital’s approach to handling 
patient safety sentinel events.  These include the role of organizational leadership to lead 
process improvements, support disclosure and the need for patient and family 
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involvement, embrace a trusting patient safety environment, and identify the needs of 
second victims by offering organized support structures for employees who were 
involved
36
.  The new policy will also expand to include certain harm events to staff, 
visitors, or vendors that occur when they are in the healthcare organization
37
.  This 
conveys the Joint Commission’s commitment to embrace a culture of safety and enforce 
security and safety within high reliability healthcare settings.   
 
3. Institute of Medicine (IOM) “To Err Is Human” Report 
As mentioned earlier, the IOM report emphasized the significant number of reported 
deaths due to the occurrence of medical errors in the American healthcare system.  Some 











.  Regardless, each of these 
deaths has a significant impact on the patient and then the second victim.   
 
In an effort to reduce the number of medical errors and patient deaths, the IOM report 
identified five main principles for designing safer systems in healthcare organizations.  
These principles were borrowed from other high-risk industries and can also be applied to 
developing second victim support programs.  They include: (1) providing leadership, (2) 
respecting human limits in the design process, (3) promoting effective team functioning, 




4. Legal Implications: “Provider-Patient” Privilege  
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The development of second victim support programs has outrun legislation where 
communication between second victims and a second victim support program may or 
may not be protected in court
117
.  This can lead to uncertain costs and benefits for both 
the second victim and the organization that offered the support.  These uncertainties have 
negative implications for organizational second victim support programs in that staff may 
feel stigmatized in accessing support following an unanticipated adverse event.  Since 
legislation that protects healthcare providers in seeking psychological support as second 
victims remains to be unclear, it is essential to propose laws that protect communications 
where psychological first aid, for instance, is provided through second victim programs.  
Including such protections in federal legislation, such as the Patient Safety and Quality 
Improvement Act of 2005, would provide additional support for both the second victims 




.  In an 
effort to establish an environment where second victims feel safe expressing their 




Healthcare involves preventable errors and risks that should be analyzed and reduced to 
save patient lives.  Therefore, understanding the scope of the second victim problem and 
the characteristics of existing interventions will contribute to optimizing the healthcare 
delivery system from a public health perspective.  Although some hospitals have 
developed and implemented second victim programs in their organizations, further 
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research is required to advance best practices in providing timely support to second 
victims.  In conclusion, this study will use the Malcolm Baldrige Health Care Criteria for 
Performance Excellence framework as a platform to focus organizational leadership 





“Does One Size Fit All?   
Assessing the Need for Organizational Second Victim Support Programs”  
 
ABSTRACT  
Background:  Second victims are healthcare providers who are emotionally traumatized 
after experiencing an unanticipated adverse event.  To support second victims, 
organizations can provide a dedicated support program for their employees.  The aim of 
this study was to assess the extent of the second victim problem in acute care hospitals in 
the State of Maryland, the availability of emotional support services, and the need for 
organizational second victim support programs. 
Methods:  In-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 43 patient safety 
representatives from 38 acute hospitals in Maryland.  Descriptive statistics were 
generated for both hospital and participant characteristics.  Data were analyzed in the 
QSR NVivo10 software using a mixed-methods approach to generate codes and extract 
themes from the interviews. 
Results:   The response rate was 83%.  All participants believed that they and their 
executives were aware that the second victim problem exists.  Although participants 
varied in their perceptions of whether a second victim program would be helpful, all of 
the participants agreed that hospitals should offer organizational support programs for 
their own staff that become second victims.  Although some organizations are attempting 
to promote a ‘just culture’ in responding to events, there continues to be stigma attached 
with: (1) speaking up during an RCA and (2) accessing support if it was offered to 
employees.   
Conclusion:  The second victim problem is recognized in all hospitals in Maryland.  
However, even when support is available, healthcare providers face stigma and other 
barriers in accessing them. Future efforts should assess the need for second victim 
programs from the perspectives of second victims themselves to identify barriers and 





She was devastated.  Donna, a tenured ICU nurse, realized she had just made a 
medication error that harmed her 8-month-old patient.  Donna doubted herself—“Am I 
competent to be a nurse?”  She was angry—“What was I thinking?!”  “What if the patient 
died?!”  As she was filling out an incident report, Donna felt sad, hopeless, and 
anxious—all at the same time.  As a caregiver who unintentionally harmed a patient, and 
a second victim herself, Donna was going through many feelings and anxiety about what 
would happen to her patient.  Importantly, she did not know what this meant for her 
nursing career—was she going to be disciplined or re-educated?  Even worse—was she 
going to be let go and perhaps lose her nursing license? 
 
In fact, Donna was not the only one experiencing distress.  The nursing student who was 
shadowing Donna was in shock.  The pharmacist who regularly visited the patient was 
distressed about the error.  And the physician who was taking care of the patient felt 
guilty.   
 
This situation, which is not uncommon in healthcare, raises a larger concern—Do we, as 
patient safety leaders, provide support to staff that experience stressful patient related 
events?  To what extent do we recognize the existence of the second victim problem in 
our own institutions?  Does our organization offer any type of support?  And while many 
of us may respond with—“Yes.  We have an employee assistance program,” the next 
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question is—“Is this enough?” If it is not, and caregivers are coming to work everyday 
carrying guilt, doubt, and fear as they take care of patients, this is an important concern. 
 
One of the ways in which organizations can help second victims cope effectively with 
their emotions is to develop and offer an in-house second victim support program
130
.  
Currently, however, there are only a few organizational second victim support programs 
documented in the literature.  Existing programs, such as the Johns Hopkins’ RISE 
program, and the University of Missouri’s forYOU program, are examples of 





Some hospitals have borrowed concepts and programs from non-healthcare industries to 
support their staff after they have experienced unanticipated stressful patient related 
events; these include Critical Incident Stress Management and Psychological First Aid.  
However, relatively little has been published on the needs among healthcare 
organizations for programs to support second victims. 
 
This study was conducted to assess the extent of the second victim problem, the 
availability of emotional support services, and the need for organizational second victim 




Study Design & Setting 
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This was a mixed-method research study to determine the perceived need for second 
victim support services and understand current support programs or mechanisms 
available for second victims in Maryland hospitals.   In-depth interviews were conducted 
with patient safety representatives from a population of 46 acute care hospitals in the 
state of Maryland.  From the 46 hospitals that were contacted, 43 individuals agreed to 
participate.  Since some hospitals had more than one representative participate in the 
study, a total of 38 hospitals are represented (83% response rate).  Interviews were guided 
by a pre-developed questionnaire and were conducted between December 2013 and 
February 2014.  The Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health 
Institutional Review Board approved this research and determined it to be not human 
subjects research (November 18, 2013: IRB 00005464). 
 
Two data collection methodologies were used: gathering information on hospital 
characteristics and conducting the semi-structured in-depth interviews.  The hospitals 
selected to participate in the study were chosen based on their ‘acute, general, and special 
hospital’ status in the Licensee Directory regulated by the Department of Health and 
Mental Hygiene: Office of Health Care Quality (OHCQ)
120
.  The OHCQ licenses and 
certifies Maryland’s healthcare facilities and monitors the quality of care in 14,000 
healthcare community and residential programs in Maryland.   
 
 
The Interview Guide & Questionnaire 
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A semi-structured interview guide was developed to provide participants with details on 
the purpose of the study, the questionnaire, and instructions to schedule the phone 
interview.  The interview guide included the following: endorsement letters from the 
Johns Hopkins University and the Maryland Patient Safety Center, consent forms, 
Institutional Review Board approval and the questionnaire.  The questionnaire used 
existing and new questions developed in an iterative process by the primary researcher.  
The questionnaire was pilot-tested with one patient safety nurse, which led to further 
refinement of the questions as well as additional probes.  Feedback was also obtained on 
length and wording of the questions from experts in patient safety, health services 
research, pastoral care, and clinical services.  The exact number of questions asked of 
participants varied based on the information they offered. 
 
The questionnaire captured demographic characteristics (10 items), participant 
perceptions of the extent of the second victim problem and the impact of adverse events 
on second victims (6 items), participants’ roles in providing and offering support to 
second victims (5 items), and the extent to which support services would be accessed by 
second victims (2 items).  The questionnaire also asked participants to respond to a 
second victim scenario.  Additional questions were included at the end of the survey from 
an existing questionnaire on whether and how healthcare institutions support health 
workers after adverse events
121
.  This questionnaire was divided into three major 
categories and aimed to measure the following variables: 
 
TABLE I:  INTERVIEW GUIDE & PRINCIPAL MEASUREMENT VARIABLES: 
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Domains of In-Depth Interview 
Interview Domains Number of Questions 
Part I:    Demographic characteristics  10 questions 
Part II:   Accessing Need for Support Program  12 questions 
Part III:  Support Structure at Your Hospital   
   Section A:  Existing support structure  16 questions 
   Section B:  Interest in developing a support structure 14 questions 
   Section C:  Do not plan to implement a program/Do not know 2 questions 
 
 
Summary of Principal Measurement Variables 
 
 
Variables Measures/Interview Questions & Scales 
Questionnaire/ 
Citation 




   Teaching 






   Small (less than 200 beds) 
   Medium (200-299) 





   Urban 






   Female 






   MD 
   JD 
   RN 
   MSN 
   PhD 
   CPHRM 
   CPHQ 
   ARM 
   CPCU 
   Other 
“Healthcare 
Worker Support 








Title & Role 
   Officer 
   Manager 
   Director 




   patient safety 
   quality of care 
   quality management 
   risk management 
   infection control 









Number of Years in Position 
   less than a year 
   1 to 5 years 
   6 to 10 years 
   11 to 15 years 




Number of Years at Primary Institution 
   less than a year 
   1 to 5 years 
   6 to 10 years 
   11 to 15 years 
   16 to 20 years 
   over 20 years 
“Healthcare 
Worker Support 






  Dependent Variables 
 
Awareness on extent 
of second victim 
problem 
To what extent do you believe the second victim 
problem is relevant to your organization? 







In your opinion, what is your executive leadership’s 
awareness of the emotional impact of adverse events on 
caregivers? 










offered or lack 
thereof 
Consider the following scenario:  A nurse at your 
hospital contributed to a medication error that left an 8-
month-old patient suffer from this error.   
a. What would happen at your institution following 







b. What do you think is the organization’s 










To what extent do you:  
a. believe that hospitals should offer a support 
program for their own staff who become “second 
victims”? [5-point Agreement Scale: Strongly 








b. believe that an organizational support program 
will be helpful in addressing second victims’ 
needs? [5-point Agreement Scale: Strongly 





c. agree there is enough of a need at your 
organization to devote resources to a support 
program?  [5-point Agreement Scale: Strongly 










In your opinion, which of the following represent 
barriers to developing a program for caregiver support 
in your organization? 
 Funding 
 Stigma 
 Trust & concerns about confidentiality 
 Lack of interest on the part of staff 
 Uncertainty about best practices 
 Lack of clinical leaders to serve as peer support 
personnel 
 Buy-in by executive leadership 


















If organizational support were available for employees 
involved in stressful patient-related events, how willing 
to you think employees would be to use it?  [5-point 











This interview guide was sent to the participants before scheduling the interview, so that 
they could familiarize themselves with the scope of the questionnaire and gather relevant 
information as necessary.   
 
Data Collection: Recruitment and Participant Selection 
Semi-structured, in-depth interviews was chosen as the method for data collection 
because they allow participants to explore their personal experiences, share their 
thoughts, and address the specific research aims presented in the interview questionnaire.  
Purposive sampling was used to recruit and select the participants in the study.  Since 
patient safety representatives at different organizations have various titles, one of the 
main inclusion criteria for participants of this study was serving as a patient safety or 
quality organizational representatives at the department level or above with a safety 
leadership position.  Patient safety representatives within the selected hospitals were 
further identified based on the following: participants’ role in overseeing patient safety 
programs and/or event reporting as well as recommendations from the hospital’s 
executive(s) or colleague(s).  These participants had the potential to offer important 
information that was relevant to the research question and purpose of the study. 
 
Potential participants were contacted by telephone or by email at the end of November 
2013 and early December 2013 and invited to participate in the study and to schedule a 
telephone interview.  Verbal consent was obtained from all participants; the interviewees 
were asked for their permission to audio record the interviews.  The recorded interviews 
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were transcribed verbatim; reliability was verified by checking the recordings against the 
transcripts.  Since the questions were administered via telephone, this group of 
participants was initially identifiable; however, for the purpose of reporting these results, 
participants and their institutions were de-identified.  Interviews lasted between 14 to 65 
minutes.   
 
TABLE II: HOSPITAL AND PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS 
 Hospital Demographics n (%) 
Total  38 (100) 
Bed Size 
 
   Small (less than 200 beds) 16 (42.1) 
   Medium (200-299 beds) 13 (34.2)  
   Large (more than 300 beds) 9 (23.7) 
 
Teaching Status   
   Teaching 17 (44.7)  
   Non-Teaching 21 (55.3)  
 
Urban/Rural  
   Urban 33 (86.8) 
   Rural 5 (13.2) 
 
 
Participant Demographics n (%) 
Total 43 (100) 
Gender 43 (100) 
   Female 39 (90.7) 
   Male 4 (9.3) 
Education 83 (100)  
RN 35 (42.2) 
Masters Degree* 17 (20.5) 
   MSN 8 (9.6) 
CPHQ 7 (8.4) 
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CPHRM 4 (4.8) 
JD 2 (2.4) 
Doctorate 2 (2.4) 
Other** 8 (9.6) 
* healthcare risk management, nursing informatics, business administration, health & 
public policy, public health, applied behavioral science, social work 
** certified by Infection Control Board, Certified Emergency Nurse, Certified Legal 
Nurse Consultant, EDD, RRT, Registered Health Information Administrator, PA, 
bachelor of science 
 
Title & Role  
Officer 7 (16.3)  
Manager 21 (48.8) 
Director 10 (23.3) 
Executive 5 (11.6) 
  
 
Role Responsibilities   
   patient safety 38 (90.5) 
   quality of care 26 (61.9) 
   quality management 27 (64.3) 
   risk management 26 (61.9) 
   infection control 15 (35.7) 
   emergency preparedness 10 (23.8) 
   regulatory & accreditation 7 (18.4) 
   case management 5 (11.9) 
   rehabilitation services 2 (4.76) 
   other* 17 (39.5) 
Number of years in position 
    less than a year 11 (25.6) 
   1 to 5 years 17 (39.5) 
   6 to 10 years 5 (11.6) 
   11 to 15 years 6 (14.0) 
   over 15 years 4 (9.3) 
Number of years in primary institution   
   less than a year 3 (7.0) 
   1 to 5 years 9 (20.9) 
   6 to 10 years 6 (14.0) 
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   11 to 15 years 6 (14.0) 
   16 to 20 years 4 (9.3) 
   Over 20 years 15 (34.9) 
*  emotional & spiritual support, crisis intervention, core measures, performance 
improvement/quality assurance, medical review committee, patient complaints, data 
analysis, environmental safety, occupational health education, strategic planning, health 
information management, safety communication & education, patient advocacy, social 
work, pastoral care, privacy compliance, employee & visitor safety 
 
Data Analysis 
Each of the transcripts was importing into a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis 
software program: QSR NVivo10, and was then read carefully. NVivo was selected to 
code for themes that emerge from the data and make connections between the 
information.  Descriptive statistics for participants and hospitals were analyzed.  Hospital 
characteristics include number of licensed beds, urban versus rural status, and teaching 
status.  Hospital rural and urban status was determined based on the American Hospital 
Association (AHA) database updated monthly
122
. Teaching status, ‘teaching’ versus 
‘non-teaching,’ was identified by using the Council of Teaching Hospitals and Health 
Systems (COTH) database from the Association of American Medical Colleges (Table 
II)
123
.  The number of licensed hospital beds was extracted from the OHCQ database, 




.  The AHA reports bed size based on 
numeric categories.  In this study, hospital bed size was classified into three categories: 
‘small (less than 200 beds),’ ‘medium (200 to 299 beds),’ and ‘large (300 or more beds)’ 
based on the number of beds the hospital reported to AHA’s 2014 database
124
.  
Participant characteristics included gender, education, title & role, role responsibilities, 
tenure in their current position and in the primary institution (Table II).   
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A mixed methods approach to analyzing the data included both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches.  Quantitative responses to the interview questions for Parts I, II 
and III were summarized and presented in text and in graphic tables.  Descriptive plots 
were created for categorical and agreement-scale responses.  A qualitative approach was 
selected for coding the text and open-ended responses, where coding was performed by 
one primary coder.  Since there is limited research on this topic, a conventional approach 
to qualitative content analysis was used in this study.  In an effort to organize the data, 
the text was read multiple times and memos were written to include key notes from the 
transcripts.  After the data were summarized, codes, categories and subcategories from 
the open-ended responses were extracted from the data.  Similar patterns and themes 
across the various hospital and participant characteristics were identified.  Contextual 
relationships and comparisons were made based on hospital and participant 
characteristics.  Subsequently, direct quotes, proportions, and descriptive plots were 
created to identify patterns in the data.  
 
RESULTS 
Results from both the questionnaire and interviews are organized and presented based on 
five domains: (I) awareness of the second victim problem, (II) current organizational 
support that is offered, (III) assessment of the need for organizational support, (IV) 
development of an organizational support program, and (V) ability to access 
organizational support if offered.  Each section below first discusses quantitative findings 
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from the questionnaire and then summarizes themes which emerged from qualitative 
coding of the interview responses.  
 
Extent of Second Victim Problem 
Participant awareness. When asked their opinion on the extent of the second victim 
problem in their organization, more than half of the participants believed that it was 
either ‘extremely relevant’ or ‘very relevant.’   
 
TABLE III:   EXTENT OF SECOND VICTIM PROBLEM   (n=43) 
Extent of the Second Victim Problem (n=43) 
Category n (%) 
Extremely relevant 21 48.8 
Very relevant 14 32.6 
Somewhat relevant 6 14.0 
Slightly relevant 2 4.7 
Not at all relevant 0 0.0 
 
Participants were asked to estimate the number of staff who became distressed in a given 
year.  Estimates ranged from 20 to 4,800 to everyone in the organization.  For example, a 
director who oversees social work indicated: 
 
“I don't know if we are really lucky. I don't know if we have that many 
events…  I think our staff is good at recognizing if there is an error; they 
are good at pointing it out. I think they are supportive of each other. If I 
was to guess a number it would be less than 20—very, very low.”  [small, 
rural, non-teaching hospital] 
 




“Many!  It is a lot!  I was thinking in terms of pastoral care.  We look at 
the statistics for the number of staff we provide support to on a monthly 
basis--and this ranges from 300-400.  So I think that's about a 10
th
 of the 
staffing.  But that's an underestimate--I think 2% there is documentation 
for.”  
 
Some of these estimates were based on the number of annual reported adverse events, the 
number of root-cause-analyses or RCA’s—the process of investigating mistakes to 
prevent them from happening again, debriefings that were conducted every year, and the 
participant’s ability to identify a second victim after an event has occurred.  A Director of 
Risk Management at a small, rural, non-teaching hospital said: 
 
“I'm thinking of our sentinel events and thinking of our near misses. And 
not all of our sentinel events are death, but they are either death or 
permanent harm. And our near misses we do RCAs on and obviously 
those people are not injured. I 'm thinking of more egregious ones where--
For instance there is one I am thinking of, it's a sentinel event, and I want 
to say for the RCA, I had almost 20 people in the room and some people 
didn't come. So that's an average of 25 there.”  
 
Additionally, estimates were also based on hospital bed size and the number of employed 
staff.  At the same time, many participants were unable to quantify the number of second 
victims due to the difficulty of capturing that data: 
 
“…there are 2 different ends to this: what you know and what you don't 
know. You can't answer what you don't know.” [Patient Safety Manager; 
medium, urban, teaching hospital] 
 
“I don't know. But I have seen evidence of it. At least once a month, 
someone is distressed about a situation. And sometimes more than one 
person is distressed about the same event (when you do an RCA).” 
[Patient Safety Officer; small, urban, non-teaching hospital] 
 
“We do quality of care reviews for the reportable events and we do a root-
cause-analysis for and for other specific events--for these I know who is 
involved and who is affected. But for the other events, I would have no 
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idea.” [Director of Quality & Patient Safety; large, urban, teaching 
hospital] 
 
Executive leadership’s awareness.   When participants were asked about their executive 
leadership’s awareness of the emotional impact of adverse on caregivers, 55.8% 
mentioned they were ‘very aware,’ 32.6% were ‘somewhat aware,’ and 11.6% were 
‘minimally aware.’  None of the participants indicated that their executive leadership was 
‘unaware’ of the second victim problem. 
 
I.  Current Support Offered or Lack Thereof after an Event 
Participants were presented with a scenario:  “A nurse at your hospital contributed to a 
medication error that left an 8-month-old patient suffering from this error.”  They were 
then asked to discuss the sequence of events that would take place at their institutions 
following this error, including the type of support second victims would receive.  
Hospitals varied in the method in which they responded to this type of event if it were to 
take place at their organization.  A few themes emerged from these responses, including:  
reinforcing a no-blame and just culture, balancing accountability with system defects, and 
understanding the root causes of the event to prevent it from happening again.  Figure 1 
portrays an example of a common path experienced by the hospitals.  Some organizations 
disciplined their staff and included HR if the behavior was determined to be reckless or 
negligent.  Other organizations were proactive in the way they provided support to staff 
as opposed to being reactive and recommending EAP services. 
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FIGURE I: SEQUENCE OF EVENTS AFTER AN EVENT OCCURS 
 
Throughout this process, unit managers would be supportive of the staff member, 
including his/her feelings about the event, and focus on the details of the event rather than 
blaming the staff member for what happened.  Some hospitals and managers took 
additional steps in recommending additional emotional support services to staff, such as 
grief counselors, chaplain services, or a second victim support program.  A handful of 
hospitals indicated that there would be disciplinary action for the employee and that 
he/she would be referred to HR; this could lead to actions including to the nurse being 
suspended. 
 
Most, if not all, of the participants believed that it is the organization’s responsibility to 
support this nurse.  However, some hospitals indicated that the organization would not be 
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responsible if the nurse’s behavior was identified as at-risk behavior or negligent.  One of 
the most common themes was the organization’s responsibility to adopt a just culture and 
support the nurse and staff throughout the investigation process as well as during and 
after the RCA.  The opportunity to allow this nurse to contribute to a change in clinical 
practice or a revision of an organizational policy would be one of the best approaches in 
handling the situation.  Also, reinforcing a just culture among the staff on the unit was 
critical; this will prevent staff from blaming their colleagues.  The second theme was the 
organization’s responsibility in recognizing the nurse’s feelings and referring him/her to 
EAP.  The third theme was the need to establish a formal emotional support program 
beyond the EAP, which would be based on timely support provided by peers. 
 
Assessment of the Need for Organizational Support  
 
TABLE IV: ASSESSING NEED FOR ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT 
 
 
a. Hospitals should offer a support program for their own staff 
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Almost all (97.7%) participants strongly agreed that hospitals should offer a support 
program for their staff who become second victims.  A few participants indicated the 
importance of offering support based on their past experiences as a clinician and based on 
recent events that occurred in their institutions: 
 
“… I worked on the clinical side. And I know it is very stressful, time 
consuming, and emotional when there is an adverse event. Certainly a 
support program would be awesome.” [Quality Manager; medium, urban, 
teaching hospital] 
 
“Just thinking of two stressful events that have happened in the past 16-18 
months. I think we really had to be creative and try to find resources for 
staff who are second victims. Where if we had an organized program, it 
would be well received and utilized. It's really hard to pull it together after 
the event without a structure. And the emotions are running so high, and 
you need to have something in place so when an event happens, you are 
ready to respond.” [Manager of Accreditation & Regulatory Compliance; 
medium, urban, teaching hospital] 
 
“I have been a nurse for 34 years... And clinical incident stress debriefing 
and support programs are critical for staff… I have done clinical research, 
and it is very, very stressful and we do second guess ourselves and we still 
remember things over the course of the years. I have not been at [this 
institution] long enough to really have a sense what resources they are 
willing and able to devote to a support program. But do I believe that there 
is something that is needed? Absolutely.” [Patient Safety Officer who 
oversees risk and compliance; small, urban, non-teaching hospital] 
 
 
b. Organizational support program will be helpful in addressing second victims’ 
needs 
An overwhelming proportion of participants agreed (93%) that an organizational support 
program would be helpful in addressing second victims’ needs.  A clinical director 
working at a large, urban, teaching institution indicated: 
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“… I have taken the responsibility with a group of nurses in creating a 
support program for our employees involved in a critical incident… We 
identified that it was helpful and the hospital should offer it and that there 
is enough of a need and its hard to quantify but we feel strongly that we 
have an impact on retaining those nurses and keeping them in their work 
environment thanks to the support that we have been able to offer and the 
bridge to EAP that we have created.”  
 
An executive at a medium, urban, non-teaching hospital also agreed: 
 
 
“We need to get better at supporting the second victim.”  
 
 
However, a few were unsure of how the support program would be structured and how it 
would function.  One risk manager at a large, urban, non-teaching hospital said: 
 
“I don't know what it would look like or how it would be implemented. So 
I don't know if it would be helpful or not.” 
 
 
Some participants believed that in order for support to be helpful, it is essential to clearly 
state the intent of the program and how it is designed to be confidential.  A patient safety 
manager said: 
 
“I think if the employee understood that this was something confidential, 
there is no documentation and it was a time to focus on their needs 
solely—and it’s like what happens in Vegas stays in Vegas, I think they 
would be extremely willing…”  [medium, urban, teaching hospital] 
 
 
A director of nursing and patient safety also expressed the same concerns: 
 
“I think initially staff will be hesitant to use the support services in our 
organization due to a culture of mistrust. If the support service was 
designed to be confidential, anonymous, and beneficial, overtime 




Others indicated that not every staff member will access the support if it is offered.  One 
executive who oversees patient safety at a  small, urban, non-teaching hospital said:
 
“I don't think that the second victim will always take the help we offer 
them.”  
 
c. Perceived need justifies investment resources to a support program 
Most of the participants (72.1%) agreed that there is enough of a need at their institutions 
to devote resources to develop a support program.  However, the level of agreement 
varied based on the reasons mentioned below.  Some institutions have already started 
developing a program by utilizing existing resources.  One risk manager mentioned:   
 
“… I think the need to devote resources to a support program to some 
extent can be found within the resources we have already—so not 
necessarily new resources. I don't think we need to hire new staff to do it. I 
think we can prioritize existing staff. Support comes from your peers and 
your managers.” [large, urban, non-teaching hospital] 
 
A few organizations believed that they already have a strong employee assistance 
program that supports second victims’ needs.  Many hospitals indicated that resources 
and funding were scarce, and developing a program would be challenging.  A patient 
safety manager at a  medium, urban, teaching hospital said:
 
“I think from the need perspective, I strongly agree. Whether we have the 
resources to really implement this is the question at this point. Because 
people are pulled in so many different directions.”  
 
An executive also agreed and mentioned: 
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“I know financial resources are somewhat tight right now, so I just don't 
know if they can afford to provide additional resources at present.” 
[medium, urban, teaching hospital] 
 
Some hospitals mentioned that if they were given a guide to implement a program to 
implement, they would be more likely to embrace it.  The reason for this is that it will 
take time and additional resources to research and plan how and what the support 
program would look like.  A quality and patient safety coordinator at a small, urban, non-
teaching hospital said: 
 
“I think if we brought it to a forefront and there was data to show the 
impact and the benefit, then it would be more sell-able. But obviously in 
healthcare, resources are so scant… I definitely think it would be 
beneficial.”  
 
Some of the smaller hospitals believed that due to their size, they would not 
necessarily devote additional resources to develop a support structure.  For 
instance, a patient safety officer at a small, urban, non-teaching hospital said: 
 
“It's a smaller hospital. And the culture here is much more family-like. 
Folks that work at this hospital are here for a very long time. And they 
have their own family support system in place, which makes a big 
difference.”  
 
A Director of Social Work also agreed:  
 
 “…We have an advantage of having a small hospital. So when I think in 
terms of a larger hospital or a trauma hospital where things are more 
hectic, then I absolutely strongly agree, they should have a support 
program for their staff…Because we are a close-knit community… those 
negative health events that are going on, so just the illness itself, not 
necessarily an error, sometimes they are traumatic to hospital staff because 
sometimes they are working with their friends, family or their family.” 




II. Development and Barriers to An Organizational Support Program 
 
TABLE V: BARRIERS TO DEVELOPING A SUPPORT PROGRAM 
 
Barriers to Developing a Support Program (n=43) 
  n (%) 
Funding 29 27.10 
Stigma 15 14.02 
Trust & concerns about confidentiality 14 13.08 
Lack of interest on the part of staff 11 10.28 
Uncertainty about best practices 10 9.35 
Lack of clinical leaders to serve as peer support personnel 6 5.61 
Buy-in by executive leadership 4 3.74 
Legal or regulatory concerns 4 3.74 
Other      
    Education 5 4.67 
    No barriers 4 3.74 
    Time  3 2.80 
    Resources & Infrastructure 2 1.87 
Don't know 0 0 
 
The five most frequent barriers to the development of an organizational support program 
included funding, stigma, trust & concerns about confidentiality, lack of interest on the 
part of staff, and uncertainty about best practices (Table V).  Participants described 
additional barriers that were not included in the original list of barriers.  These included 
education, time & lack of ability to access support, resources & infrastructure.  
‘Education’ referred to both: the lack of individuals’ ability to understand the long-term 
stress of repeated adverse events as well as the awareness about understanding the 
purpose of the program.  One patient safety officer mentioned: 
“I feel how you communicate that message is how the staff will react or 
not react at all.  That comes from the very top where the individuals are 
leading the organization.” [large, urban, teaching hospital  ]
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Some participants could not identify any barriers that would hinder their ability to 
develop a program. Others mentioned that as they are developing their support program, 
they are not encountering any barriers.  Some participants believed having time to access 
the support would be a barrier; for instance, a staff member’s lack of ability to be 
released from unit to access support is an issue.  Finally, a few participants indicated that 
resources and infrastructure in general would be a barrier to developing a program.  A 
Director of Quality at a : medium, urban, teaching hospital said
 
“Volume.  If we felt there was something like this, we don’t have a 
volume to support developing a structured program.” 
 
 
Willingness of Staff Members to Access Organizational Support 
If organizational support was offered to second victims, many of the participants 
indicated that staff would be ‘somewhat willing’ (46.5%) or ‘very willing’ (39.5%) to 
access support (TABLE VI). 
 
FIGURE II: WILLINGNESS OF STAFF TO ACCESS ORGANIZATIONAL 




TABLE VI: RATIONALE FOR WILLINGNESS TO ACCESS 
ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT (n=43)  
If organizational support were available for employees 
involved in stressful patient-related events, how willing to 
you think employees would be to use it?  Why or why not?   n (%) 
Staff are willing to discuss the event 16 29.1 
Participants are unsure of staff response to a new program 8 14.6 
Existence of no-blame culture 7 12.7 
Stigma in asking for help 6 10.9 
EAP is currently offered to staff 5 9.1 
Staff do not recognize a need to access support 5 9.1 
Staff prefer informal support 5 9.1 
Issues with trust and concern about confidentiality 3 5.5 
Total 55 100 
 
Participants were asked to describe the rationale for staff members’ willingness to access 
organizational support.  Many of the participants indicated that staff were open and 
willing to discuss the event and acknowledge what they are going through after being 
involved.  Some participants mentioned that staff would like to talk about the event in an 
open setting with their peers.  This will not only reinforce their personal and professional 
competencies, but it will also help second victims better understand that errors are the 
result of a system and not an individual’s fault.  One participant indicated that some 
tenured clinicians will say, “I was involved in an adverse event.  I want support.”  A 
patient safety director from a small, rural, non-teaching hospital mentioned:  
 
“I run all the root cause analyses here…and usually staff are really 
affected no matter how big or small the event and always willing to 
participate in these events and openly sometimes talk about their grief and 
how it affected them.  I do think it would be helpful and I do think they 
would seek it.” 
 
A manager who oversees accreditation and regulatory compliance said: 
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“When we have these events, the staff feels abandoned sometimes.  Where 
is the organization for me? Why does it take so long to find something?  
They want support.” [medium, urban, teaching hospital  ]
 
Other participants mentioned that they are unsure of how staff would react to an 
organizational support program, given that a second victim program would be a novel 
concept in their hospital.  However, in their experiences, the participants reported that 
staff would be willing to use a program only if it was well structured, well presented, and 
where staff would have a good understanding about the program goals.  Additionally, a 
few participants believed that staff would access organizational support if a no-blame and 
just culture was in place rather than in a punitive environment where staff would be 
hesitant and reluctant to talk about the error.  An executive who oversees patient safety at 
a large, urban, non-teaching hospital said: 
 
“I think that if people are comfortable in a position or in an environment 
that they feel safe accessing help and support, then I think they will do it.”  
 
Other participants indicated that staff would less likely to access a program because there 
is social stigma and shame in reaching out for support.  Some participants believed that 
staff would be concerned about trust and confidentiality of an organizational support 
program.  Furthermore, a few participants mentioned that some staff do not recognize the 
importance of accessing support after an adverse event and would rather not ask for 
outside assistance or place things ‘on the back burner and move on.’  A Director of 
Quality, Patient Safety and Risk Management said: 
“There are some people that believe they don’t need it [organizational 
support] and personally been involved with people who are in stressful 
events and don’t talk about it and then later talk about how they can’t 
sleep and feel very stressful.”  [large, urban, teaching hospital  ]
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It was felt that some staff would not activate organizational support since an employee 
assistance program is already offered to staff that need help.  On the other hand, some 
participants indicated that even after they have offered EAP services to their staff, staff 
would prefer to speak to their peers about the event.  A patient safety officer at a small, 
urban, non-teaching hospital also agreed: 
 
“There is a lot of support: nurse to nurse within the organization.  That’s 




This study assessed the perceived need for organizational second victim support services 
among patient safety representatives in acute care hospitals in Maryland.  Participants 
shared their perceptions on the extent of the second victim problem and how it impacts 
patient care, as well as the need for organizational support.  Results suggest several 
important findings, as well as avenues for future research. 
All participants reported that they and their executives were aware that the second victim 
problem exists in their institutions and realized that this could impact patient care.  
However, the level of awareness varied across hospitals and participants.  This is 














Furthermore, participants agreed unanimously that hospitals should offer organizational 
support programs for their own staff that become second victims.  This is consistent with 
other findings in the literature
130
.  However, participants varied in their perceptions of 
whether organizational support would be helpful in addressing second victims’ needs.  
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Some participants reported that employee assistance programs already offer support, and 
were unsure of how staff would react to a new support program offered by the institution.  
In the scenario that was presented, almost all of the participants believed that it is the 
organization’s responsibility to support the nurse who contributed to the error.  However, 
some hospitals indicated that the organization would not be responsible if the nurse’s 
behavior was identified as at-risk behavior or negligent.  If some of the participants felt 
this way toward the nurse, then this will perhaps make the second victim feel worse about 
the outcome. 
 
When asked about staff members’ willingness to access organizational support, many of 
the patient safety representatives believed that staff were willing to discuss the event with 
or among peers and if it was transparent, well-structured and well-presented.  It is 
apparent that regardless of the organizations’ efforts in promoting a no-blame, just 
culture, there continues to be stigma attached with speaking up during an RCA since 
some staff are disciplined after an event is reported, and accessing support if it was 
offered to employees.  Furthermore, some staff would value informal peer support rather 
than accessing organizational support.  Regardless of the type of support that is offered, 
formal versus informal, it is apparent that there is an unmet need. 
 
In the event that an organization should plan to offer a support program, participants 
indicated that the top barriers to developing a program include funding, stigma, trust and 
concerns about confidentiality, lack of interest on the part of staff, and uncertainty about 
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best practices.  Given that these barriers are common for any newly developed program, 
it is important that institutions offering staff support dedicate resources to education on 
the importance of seeking support as it relates to personal lives and professional roles.  
Some participants indicated that if there were data that support the benefit and impact of 
a second victim program on clinicians, then they are more likely to adopt a program.  
This should be an area of focus for future research. 
 
It was apparent that smaller hospitals were less likely to develop a second victim program 
due to the strong social support present in their institutions.  However, limited resources 
are a barrier to developing a program regardless of the hospital’s size, teaching status, 
and urban/rural status. 
 
In summary, our funding supports the ubiquity of the second victim problem in acute care 
hospitals, and the importance of having an organizational support system, and shed light 
on barriers to providing such a system.  Our findings echo previous calls for developing 
and offering clinician support
130
.  For these services to be used, patient safety leaders 
should communicate a compelling vision to promote a just culture of patient safety, so 
that staff in need feel it is safe to access support. 
 
There is no consensus in the field on best practices in providing support.  Johns Hopkins 
Hospital is developing a guide to replicating components of its second victim support 
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program, RISE (Resilience In Stressful Events), including tools, questionnaires, and a 
roadmap for organizations to implement and evaluate their own programs. 
 
Results from the current study provide support for future work to establish organizational 
second victim support services and to influence policy decisions that affect caregiver 
support.  Additionally, this study adds to a growing body of literature regarding second 








.   
LIMITATIONS 
One of the challenges of conducting this study was to identify individuals to participate in 
the study.  Since hospitals vary in their patient safety and quality structures, there was a 
lack of consistency in the definition of role of the participants, which included patient 
safety officers, managers, directors and executives.  Additionally, these participants 
varied in the scope and type of responsibilities included in their positions, such as quality 
of care, patient safety, quality management, risk management, infection control, 
regulatory and accreditation, etc.  This may have reduced the validity of their reports.  
We did not interview frontline health care workers, whose perceptions may differ from 
managers, and who may have been able to articulate additional barriers to their use of 
support services.  Another limitation relates to the fact that the interview questionnaire 
has not been validated; however there is no comparable survey that could have been 
utilized.  Additionally, there may have been some bias in conducting and coding the 
interviews since these were performed by one individual (HE). Finally, all of the 
participating hospitals were located in Maryland.  Hospitals in other regions may 
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experience different barriers and issues. Similar studies should be conducted in other 




This study describes the second victim problem Maryland hospitals from the perspective 
of institutional leaders in patient safety, and the efforts and aspirations of institutions to 
provide psychological support to their health care workers.  There are several 
implications for practice and policies.  Hospitals should implement second victim 
programs to assist their staff in effectively coping with their emotions following an 
unanticipated adverse event.  State and Federal institutions should support these efforts.  
Future research would benefit information on desired features and barriers to 
implementation from additional stakeholders, including second victims, senior 
executives, and perhaps even patients.  Additional research should focus specifically on 
the stigma second victims experience after they report an adverse event.  Manuscript #2 
focuses on features and services of an ideal support structure as well as examples of 




[TABLE I:  INTERVIEW GUIDE QUESTIONNAIRE] 
 
PART 1:  DEMOGRAPHICS 
1. What is the name of the institution where you work?   
2. What is your gender?  
3. Please tell me the exact title of your position.  
4. How long have you held this position?  
5. What is your degree/certification?  
6. Please tell me what responsibilities are included in your position  
7. Where is patient safety located on your hospital’s organizational chart? Please 
provide a copy of the organizational chart. 
8. To whom do you report? 
9. Are there other staff who primarily work on patient safety?  How large is the patient 
safety effort in your hospital in terms of FTE’s? 
10. How many years have you worked at your primary institution?  
 
PART 2:  ASSESSING NEED FOR SUPPORT PROGRAM 
2. To what extent do you believe the second victim problem is relevant to your 
organization? 
3. In any given year, how many hospital staff do you believe become distressed as a 
result of unanticipated stressful patient related events?  
4. To what extent do you:  
a. believe that hospitals should offer a support program for their own staff who 
become “second victims”? 
b. believe that an organizational support program will be helpful in addressing second 
victims’ needs? 
c. agree there is enough of a need at your organization to devote resources to a support 
program?   
5. If organizational support were available for employees involved in stressful patient-
related events, how willing to you think employees would be to use it?   
a. Why or why not?   
6. In your opinion, which of the following represent barriers to developing a program 
for caregiver support in your organization?  
7.  In your opinion, what is your executive leadership’s awareness of the emotional 
impact of adverse events on caregivers. 
8. Do you have an employee assistance program? 
9. In what way does your employee assistance program play a role in second victim 
support? 
10. Consider the following scenario:  A nurse at your hospital contributed to a medication 
error that left an 8-month-old patient suffer from this error.   
a. What would happen at your institution following this event? 
b. What do you think is the organization’s responsibility in supporting this nurse? 
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11. If organizational support is provided for employees involved in stressful patient-
related events, what features/services would be helpful to employees? 
12. If you were in a situation where you were a second victim, what type of 
organizational support would be helpful? 
 
PART 3:  SUPPORT STRUCTURE AT YOUR HOSPITAL 
1.  Does your organization have a program to offer your caregivers emotional support 
following adverse events? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Not currently, and we are in the planning phases 
 Don’t Know 
 
**If you answered “YES” to the previous question, please continue to SECTION A. 
** If you answered “NOT CURRENTLY, AND WE ARE IN THE PLANNING 
PHASES” to the previous question, please continue to SECTION B 






I:  How is your program structured and who supports it? 
 
1. How long has your program been in existence? 
2. Who leads the program?  (Choose ALL THAT APPLY) 
3. Do you have a manual, policy, or guide for providing emotional support to 
caregivers? 
4. Who provides support for caregivers?  (Choose ALL THAT APPLY) 
5. Is your program prepared to respond to groups of caregivers as well as individuals? 
6. Is caregiver support after adverse events part of your facility’s Wellness Program?  
7. How is caregiver support at your facility designed to be confidential?  
8. How is caregiver support funded financially?  
 
II:  How is support accessed and provided? 
 
9. Please select the situations in which support is offered to a caregiver:  
10. What mechanisms are available for caregivers to access support?  
11. Is there a mechanism to arrange time away from clinical service for caregivers 
involved in an adverse event? 
12. In your opinion, which of the following represent a barrier to caregivers 
ACCESSING support at your institution?  (Choose ALL THAT APPLY) 
 
III:  Program outcomes and maintenance 
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13. In your opinion, how effective is your program with regard to: 
a. Identification of caregivers in emotional distress because of involvement in an 
adverse event? 
b. Provision of support for caregivers in emotional distress? 
c. Helping staff return to work after being involved in an adverse event? 
14. What improvements would you make to the existing program?  
15. Any additional thoughts or comments on the topic of support for healthcare workers 




I:  How will your program be structured and supported? 
1. Have you identified people to lead the program?   
2. Will you have a manual, policy, or guide for providing emotional support to 
caregivers? 
3. Who will provide support for caregivers?   
4. Will training on how to support caregivers be available to those who provide support? 
5. Will your program be prepared to respond to groups of caregivers as well as 
individuals? 
6. Will caregiver support after adverse events be part of your facility’s Wellness 
Program? 
7. How will caregiver support be designed to be confidential?  Support will be… 
8. Will your program be (Choose ONE): 
9. How will caregiver support be funded?   
 
II:  How support will be accessed and provided in your proposed program 
 
For your proposed caregiver support program: 
10.  Please select the situations in which support will be offered to caregivers 
11. What mechanisms would be available for caregivers to access support? 
12. Will your program have a mechanism to arrange time away from clinical service for 
caregivers involved in an adverse event? 
13. Any additional thoughts or comments on the topic of support for healthcare workers 





1. Was a previously existing support program discontinued?  Please explain.  
2. Any additional thoughts or comments on the topic of support for healthcare workers 






“Do Maryland Hospitals Support Second Victims? 




Background: Second victims, healthcare providers who become emotionally traumatized 
after experiencing an unanticipated adverse event, are often challenged in seeking 
emotional support after an adverse event has occurred.  Even though most organizations 
offer employee assistance program (EAP) services, second victims may hesitate to access 
this support due to mistrust and perceived lack of confidentiality.  The purpose of this 
study was to describe the extent to which organizational second victim support is 
perceived as desirable by acute care hospitals in Maryland, and to identify existing 
second victim support programs. 
Methods: This mixed-methods research study included a sample of 43 patient safety 
representatives from 38 acute care hospitals in Maryland (83% response rate). Semi-
structured interviews were conducted using original questions and a pre-existing 
questionnaire.  Qualitative data were analyzed using the QSR NVivo10 software.   
Results:  Although hospitals offer EAP services to their employees, there continue to be 
gaps in the services that are provided regards timeliness of intervention, EAP staffs 
experience relating to clinical providers, and physical accessibility.  There is also no 
effective measure of the effectiveness of these services.  Additionally, there is a need for 
peer support for both the second victim and for the individuals who provide that support. 
Approximately 18% of the Maryland hospitals offer a second victim support program.  
Details on the structure, accessibility, and outcomes for these programs are described.  
Conclusion: Based on participants’ perceptions, organizations should re-evaluate the way 
in which their EAPs support staff members or offer additional support services.  Future 
research should focus on developing tools to evaluate the effectiveness of second victim 




“Thank you all for taking the time to participate in today’s root-cause-analysis.  We do 
have an employee assistance program that is available to you free of charge.”  An 
unfortunate patient event had occurred in a large teaching hospital.  The hospital’s risk 
management staff had just completed a root cause analysis (RCA) for the 5-B Med-Surg 
staff.  A physician, a few nurses, and technicians were involved in an adverse event that 
led to severe harm for their patient.  However, the incident affected not only these clinical 
providers, but also everyone on the unit.  The patient had been in the same unit for 
months and was well known by all.  Conducting an RCA offered the staff with an 
opportunity to share the facts of the story, identify defects in the system, and learn about 
opportunities for improvement. 
 
“It was helpful to provide feedback on how to improve the system, but what about how 
horrible I still feel?” thought the physician who was involved.  This was the first time he 
had felt really badly about a patient outcome.  In the past, he had heard some of his 
colleagues’ responses to others who made mistakes: “Didn’t you learn that in medical 
school?” “Pull yourself up by the bootstraps and get back to your patients.”  “Oh!  I can’t 
believe you did that!”  He knew that none of these responses would help him cope with 
what had happened.  In fact, it was one of the reasons he did not speak much during the 
RCA.  The last thing he wanted was for his physician and nursing colleagues to think he 
was clinically incompetent.   
 
 88 
He decided to call the employee assistance program (EAP) to talk to somebody about 
how badly he felt.  “We’d be happy to talk to you Dr. S.  Let’s schedule time for the end 
of next week.”  Waiting for 2 weeks to talk to someone who does not understand the 
intensity of working on a clinical unit was just too much.  Since there was nowhere else 
he could turn to, it was more convenient for this second victim to suffer in silence. 
 
It can be challenging for second victims – health care workers who are traumatized by 
patient adverse events - to receive timely support. Often EAPs must respond to a large 
volume of employee requests.  In other cases, second victims are reluctant to contact their 
EAP because they don’t believe that professional counselors have the clinical experience 
needed to relate to the second victim and the event.  In still others, they worry that the 
EAP may report back to their supervisor.  Patients safety leaders clearly acknowledge the 
importance of having an employee assistance program to support healthcare providers 
and employees after adverse events, but is this enough?   
 
In addition to EAP services, some institutions have additional resources to assist staff in 
coping with emotional problems, such as pastoral care services or debriefing teams.  A 
few hospitals have gone further and developed emotional support programs for second 
victims.  A growing number of studies have emphasized the need to develop institutional 








.  However, little is 
known about what proportion of hospitals have such programs.  
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The purpose of this study was to describe the extent to which organizational second 
victim support is perceived as desirable by patient safety representatives in Maryland 






This was a mixed methods study using interviews that included both structured and semi-
structured questions.  IRB approval was obtained from the Johns Hopkins University 
Bloomberg School of Public Health. 
 
Setting & Participant Selection 
The population for this study included hospital staff who oversee patient safety programs 
and event reporting processes in all of the 46 acute care hospitals in the state of Maryland 
that are regulated by the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene: Office of Health 
Care Quality (OHCQ)
139
.  These individuals were identified for each hospital and invited 
via phone or email to participate in the study.  The study sample included 43 participants 
representing 38 hospitals; this resulted in an 83% response rate.  Hospital characteristics 
included the number of licensed beds, urban versus rural status, and teaching status.  
Urban/rural status and the number of licensed hospital beds
 
was determined from the 




.  Hospital teaching status 
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was determined using the Council of Teaching Hospitals and Health Systems (COTH) 
database from the Association of American Medical Colleges
141
.  Semi-structured, in-




The main dependent variables were employee assistance programs, organizational support for 
employees, organizational support for participants (patient safety leaders), second victim support 
programs. perceptions about beneficial features and services of an ideal organizational 
support program, and information on existing second victim programs (Table I).  Some of 
the questions were drawn from an existing survey on whether and how hospitals support 
staff after adverse events, and feature of existing support programs
142
, while others were 
newly developed for this study.  
 
Independent variables included hospital characteristics (i.e. teaching status, urban/rural 
status, bed size) and participant characteristics (i.e. gender, role, education, number of 
years at institution, number of years in their position).   
 
Data Collection Procedures 
An interview guide was developed to collect information on participant characteristics, 
attitudes and perceptions ideal and existing support programs.  Both quantitative and 
qualitative questions were included in the interview guide. Field notes were recorded 
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during and after the interviews to capture thoughts, recurring themes, and additional 
comments.  The average interview lasted approximately 33 minutes.  Verbal consent was 
obtained to audio record the interviews, which were then transcribed verbatim.  
Anonymity of participants and hospitals was assured.   
 
Data Analysis  
Demographics and quantitative closed-ended responses from the questionnaire were 
summarized using counts and proportions.  Descriptive tables were generated to display 
information on structure, access, and program outcomes for the existing second victim 
programs.  Comparisons were made based on hospital and participant characteristics.  
Qualitative data were coded and analyzed by a primary coder using the QSR NVivo10 
qualitative data analysis software.  Representative quotes were selected and are 
presented.  
TABLE VII:  TABLE OF MEASURES  
Independent 
Variables Measures/Interview Questions & Scales 
Citation/  

















   Female 
   Male 
 
Education 
   MD 
   JD 
   RN 
   MSN 
   PhD 
   CPHRM 
   CPHQ 
   ARM 
   CPCU 











































Title & Role 
   Officer 
   Manager 
   Director 
   Executive 
 
Role Responsibilities 
   patient safety 
   quality of care 
   quality management 
   risk management 
   infection control 
   emergency preparedness 
 
Number of Years in Position 
   less than a year 
   1 to 5 years 
   6 to 10 years 
   11 to 15 years 
   more than 15 years 
 
Number of Years at Primary Institution 
   less than a year 
   1 to 5 years 
   6 to 10 years 
   11 to 15 years 
   16 to 20 years 






































   Teaching 
   Non-teaching 
 
Bed Size 
   Small (less than 200 beds) 
   Medium (200-299) 
   Large (300 or more beds) 
 
Urban/Rural Status 
   Urban 
















Do you have an employee assistance program? 
[Binary: Yes/No] Original Question 
In what way does your employee assistance program 







If organizational support is provided for employees 
involved in stressful patient-related events, what 
features/services would be helpful to employees? 





If you were in a situation where you were a second 





Does your organization have a program to offer your 

















Variables/Domains Measures/Interview Questions & Scales 
Citation/  
Source of Question 
Structure of Program 









Who provides support for caregivers?  [closed-
ended] 
Is your program prepared to respond to groups 
of caregivers as well as individuals? [binary: 
yes/no] 
How is caregiver support at your facility 
designed to be confidential? [closed-ended] 
How is caregiver support funded financially?  
[closed-ended] 
Access to Program 
Please select the situations in which support is 
offered to a caregiver.  [closed-ended] 
 
“Healthcare Worker 





What mechanisms are available for caregivers to 
access support? [closed-ended] 
 
Is there a mechanism to arrange time away from 
clinical service for caregivers involved in an 
adverse event? [closed-ended] 
In your opinion, which of the following 
represent a barrier to caregivers ACCESSING 
support at your institution?  [closed-ended] 
Program Outcome & 
Maintenance 
In your opinion, how effective is your program 
with regard to: [5-point Effectiveness Scale] 
 
“Healthcare Worker 





    a.  Identification of caregivers in emotional 
distress because of involvement in an adverse 
event? 
    b.   Provision of support for caregivers in 
emotional distress? 
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    c.  Helping staff return to work after being 
involved in an adverse event? 
What improvements would you make to the 
existing program? [open-ended] 
 
RESULTS 
There was an 83% response rate to the interview.  Most (86.6%) of the hospitals were 
urban, approximately 44.7% of the hospitals were teaching institutions, and most (42.1%) 
were categorized as ‘small’ versus 34.2% ‘medium’ (34.2%) or ‘large’ (23.7%) 
(Manuscript #1:Table II). 
 
TABLE II: HOSPITAL AND PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS  
(citation: Manuscript #1) 
 Hospital Demographics n (%) 
Total  38 (100) 
Bed Size 
 
   Small (less than 200 beds) 16 (42.1) 
   Medium (200-299 beds) 13 (34.2)  
   Large (more than 300 beds) 9 (23.7) 
 
Teaching Status   
   Teaching 17 (44.7)  
   Non-Teaching 21 (55.3)  
 
Urban/Rural  
   Urban 33 (86.8) 
   Rural 5 (13.2) 
 
 
Participant Demographics n (%) 
Total 43 (100) 
Gender 43 (100) 
   Female 39 (90.7) 
   Male 4 (9.3) 
Education 83 (100)  
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RN 35 (42.2) 
Masters Degree* 17 (20.5) 
   MSN 8 (9.6) 
CPHQ 7 (8.4) 
CPHRM 4 (4.8) 
JD 2 (2.4) 
Doctorate 2 (2.4) 
Other** 8 (9.6) 
* healthcare risk management, nursing informatics, business administration, health & 
public policy, public health, applied behavioral science, social work 
** certified by Infection Control Board, Certified Emergency Nurse, Certified Legal 
Nurse Consultant, EDD, RRT, Registered Health Information Administrator, PA, 
bachelor of science 
 
Title & Role  
Officer 7 (16.3)  
Manager 21 (48.8) 
Director 10 (23.3) 
Executive 5 (11.6) 
  
 
Role Responsibilities   
   patient safety 38 (90.5) 
   quality of care 26 (61.9) 
   quality management 27 (64.3) 
   risk management 26 (61.9) 
   infection control 15 (35.7) 
   emergency preparedness 10 (23.8) 
   regulatory & accreditation 7 (18.4) 
   case management 5 (11.9) 
   rehabilitation services 2 (4.76) 
   other* 17 (39.5) 
Number of years in position 
    less than a year 11 (25.6) 
   1 to 5 years 17 (39.5) 
   6 to 10 years 5 (11.6) 
   11 to 15 years 6 (14.0) 
   over 15 years 4 (9.3) 
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Number of years in primary institution   
   less than a year 3 (7.0) 
   1 to 5 years 9 (20.9) 
   6 to 10 years 6 (14.0) 
   11 to 15 years 6 (14.0) 
   16 to 20 years 4 (9.3) 
   Over 20 years 15 (34.9) 
*  emotional & spiritual support, crisis intervention, core measures, performance 
improvement/quality assurance, medical review committee, patient complaints, data 
analysis, environmental safety, occupational health education, strategic planning, health 
information management, safety communication & education, patient advocacy, social 
work, pastoral care, privacy compliance, employee & visitor safety 
 
Themes from the interviews were categorized into employee assistance programs, 
desirable features and services of a second victim program, organizational support for 
patient safety leaders.  Several emergent themes were extracted from the interview 
transcripts, including the role of employee assistance programs in providing support and 
the barriers of accessing their support, the importance of an easily accessible support 
program, the emotional support that is necessary for healthcare providers who are 
addressing second victims’ needs, and features of existing second victim support 
programs in Maryland.  These are described in greater detail below. 
 
I. EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 
All of the participants, with the exception of one, confirmed that their hospital offered an 
employee assistance program to staff.  When asked about their EAP’s role in providing 
second victim support, participants varied in their responses.  Some hospital staff 
reported that they actively offered it to their employees during/or after a root-cause-
analysis or if they felt that an employee was in need of EAP services.  Generally, 
recommendations to use EAP services came from leadership, unit/clinical managers, 
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patient safety or risk managers.  Other hospitals only mentioned EAP during hospital 
orientation.  An executive from a small, urban, non-teaching hospital mentioned: 
 
“Well if there is a situation with a nurse, we believe that the nurse is not 
mistaken. What we do with every RCA, one of the things I include in my 
script and what I say is that we have an EAP and remind them that they 
can be the second victim and encourage them to call them and talk to them 
[EAP] one time and if they need additional support then they can continue. 
We want them to at least make the first contact.”  
 
A director of risk management and patient safety indicated: 
 
“We use it quite liberally. We always try to offer it [EAP]... frequently we 
offer it to the entire department or group—maybe the people who were 
working that shift or whatever.” [large, urban, teaching hospital] 
 
Another director of risk management from a small, rural, non-teaching hospital reminds 
staff to use EAP and reinforces the confidentiality aspect: 
“We explain to them, ‘Please utilize this [EAP] resource.’ We pay for it 
and it costs them nothing. ‘It outlines again in bold that it's confidential. 
We will never know if you use it.’ ” 
 
In some organizations, the employee assistance programs included a team of licensed 
counselors and social workers; whereas in one organization, one employee led the EAP.  
Many participants mentioned that staff accessed the EAP for personal or work-related 
issues.  For instance, one director who works at a small, rural, non-teaching hospital said: 
“I don't know of any instance where someone went to EAP because they 
were a second victim (not that there isn't)... usually because of personal 
issues, work related issues, like schedules, problems with other co-
workers, personal issues, or even some stress or like I said compassion 
fatigue or something like that.” 
 
 
It is no doubt that EAP provides beneficial services to employees.  Even though these 
services were readily available 24 hours and seven days a week to employees, many 
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participants indicated that there were some barriers to accessing the service.  A few 
participants mentioned that their employee assistance program was not timely in 
responding to staffs’ needs.  In some cases, this forced the manager, patient safety 
representative, or executive leadership to access additional services to assist their 
employees; these services were internal or external to the organization.  A Director of 
Patient Safety from a large, urban, teaching hospital mentioned: 
“They [EAP] provide short term health evaluation and support, but are 
unable to meet the immediate response needs of second victims.”  
 
A Director of Risk Management from a small, urban, non-teaching hospital believed: 
 
“EAP is totally somebody objective and uninvolved--some people may 
want that, some people may want someone who knows about the situation 
in the hospital. It's also you don't have to wait until you get somebody on 
the phone, wait ‘til you get somebody. It's a lot of waiting in line for 
things.” 
 
Additionally, an executive who oversees patient safety in a small, urban, non-teaching 
hospital said: 
“One time we had a child die, 8-month-old infant … It was an extremely 
emotional experience. And this was one example where we called in a 
non-denominational officer to get a grief support counselor…  Everyone 
cried... And we did this immediately –and the staff said thank you for 
doing it immediately after it happened, so it was something we 
implemented for that incident…” 
 
Another executive also mentioned the importance of offering support resources in 
addition to the EAP: 
 
“We do have resources here beyond the EAP… I think we would also 
bring in services as needed—based on what we needed specifically.  I 
can't say that it is a comprehensive or necessarily well organized process.” 
[medium, urban, non-teaching hospital] 
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On the same note, a senior director who oversees quality, risk, and safety in a large, 
urban, teaching hospital agreed and mentioned that his hospital developed a structured 
support program because EAP was not meeting the immediate needs of staff: 
 
“… we recognized, it [EAP] wasn’t getting to people because we wanted 
people to be immediately available. It takes a couple of days for an EAP to 
respond, and it doesn’t seem to be in touch with the group debriefing, so 
now we have a critical incidence debriefing team.” 
 
Some participants mentioned that their EAP services were not well-advertised or were 
only introduced during new employee hospital orientation.  As a result, staff did not 
access it since they were unaware this service existed.  Most EAPs were offered as an 
internal resource to staff on-site.  However, there were a handful of programs that 
outsourced their EAP services or shared their program with another hospital.  In these 
cases, some participants mentioned that it was difficult for staff to access support due to 
the off-site location.  For instance, a director from a small, urban, teaching hospital said: 
 
“Staff can definitely schedule an appointment and go see someone. The 
biggest barrier to that is that they are not physically located where we are.” 
 
Due to confidentiality issues, all of the participants indicated that they did not receive 
formal feedback from EAP on the success of the interaction with the second victim.  
However, some participants indicated that they informally heard from staff that it was 
helpful for them to access EAP.  A director who is responsible for risk management at a 
small, rural, non-teaching hospital mentioned: 
 
“I believe I have heard nothing formal, but I do think that I have heard 




Another director who oversees patient safety at a medium-sized, urban, non-teaching 
hospital was unsure if staff were taking advantage of EAP services after it was being 
offered to them: 
 
“We will give them [staff] that information to call them [EAP] to get 
support… I don’t know how many staff access the program. It’s possible 
that the staff is not contacting the EAP at all.” 
 
In an effort to follow up with the employee on how he/she was feeling after the event, 
one participant from a large, urban, teaching hospital indicated: 
 
“We ask the employee. We don't get into what occurred, but we'll say 
things like did you take advantage of the EAP and are things going better 
for you?” 
 
Alternatively, an executive from a large, urban, non-teaching hospital does not follow up 
with employees after offering EAP to staff.  However, she does sometimes receive 
informal feedback: 
 
“Once we make the referral, we try to remain as distant as we can. And to 
be honest, once they are referred to our EAP, then that whole team handles 
them—we as leadership do not. And believe me, there are some people 
who come back to me and said, ‘Thank you so much for the referral. I 
have been to x number of sessions.’ And then they will just kind of 
divulge as much as they are comfortable with. And then with some people 
you just never know.”  
 
When one participant was asked to explain what gap existed in the current EAP structure, 
a director from a large, urban, teaching institution responded: 
 
“There is stigma attached to going to a faculty assistance program—‘there 
is something wrong with me’ kind of a message to people… When you're 
making a call to an employee assistance program, you are taking a leap 
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into you don't know who you will talk to and you hope you will get a good 
person. Whereas there is somebody local, and they are on your unit 
everyday, you know who you are talking to.” 
 
Another participant, a director who oversees quality and risk, indicated that in her 
experience, EAP is generally not aware of how to support second victims: 
 
“It doesn’t. Well because there is no awareness on the effect of adverse 
occurrences and the professionals who are involved. And therefore, there 
are no referrals to the EAP for that purpose. We need to know who to refer 
before we refer, and EAP needs to know what assistance a second victim 
needs and these conversations have not occurred. I don’t think the EAP is 
ready to provide these services. I don’t think that on their part they are 
aware of second victims as well.” [small, urban, non-teaching hospital] 
 
At the end of the day, staff would like for someone to listen to them after they had 
experienced an unfortunate patient event.  A director who regularly provides support to 
staff as part of her role said: 
 
“Sometimes people don't need to go to an EAP program. They just need 
someone to listen to and move forward… And even though they [EAP] 
were there and available, people were not taking advantage of it. So this 
was kind of a bridge--having a specific program will help bridge to more 
long term programs, like [EAP] here.” [large, urban, teaching hospital] 
 
II. DESIRABLE FEATURES AND SERVICES IN A SECOND VICTIM 
PROGRAM  
Participants mentioned that if a second victim support program was offered to employees 
involved in stressful patient-related events, it would need to be confidential, well-
structured, and well-articulated. A patient safety manager at a medium-sized, urban, 
teaching hospital indicated: 
 
“I think it’s important to define the criteria and how the program would be 
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utilized and define what circumstances would best benefit the employee 
and then talk about how to engage with the employee… And the purpose 
needs to be clearly understood and trusted—that it is to help them [staff]; 
that it is confidential.  There is no documentation.  It’s not moving into 
HR, not becoming disciplinary.  It’s not part of your performance.  It is a 
program to help you work through and talk about what happened.” 
 
All of the participants indicated that staff would benefit from a confidential support 
program that would allow them to talk to someone about the event and the feelings they 
experienced after the event.  Whether this type of support would be offered individually 
or in a group setting would be at the discretion of the employee(s) to decide, given that 
staff benefited from different types of support.  Some participants indicated that offering 
counseling in a support program, similar to what is offered in their current EAP, would 
be helpful.  A patient safety director at a medium-sized, urban, non-teaching hospital 
mentioned: 
 
“I think providing them [staff] with counseling and going through the 
grieving process is the most important thing.  They [staff] need an open 
door, so if they do need to talk, they can feel free to do that.  They might 
need time off if they are stressed.” 
 
One patient safety officer agreed that counseling would be helpful, and also believed that 
it was important to address second victims’ needs after the counseling session: 
 
“Support groups aren't good for everyone: sometimes people are more 
introverted and don't like to openly share in group settings.  So individual 
counseling sessions, so they can lend themselves to letting staff talk and 
talk about their sadness and their fears--I think that's one thing we don't 
necessarily address--is their fears moving forward.” [small, urban, non-
teaching hospital] 
 
Participants mentioned the importance of holding an immediate debriefing session 
following the occurrence of the event.  A debriefing session would allow staff to identify 
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system defects, so that the event will less likely happen again.  A quality and patient 
safety director from a large, urban, teaching hospital mentioned: 
 
“So even if you may be the one committing the event, there is usually 
something in the Swiss cheese model where it could have been prevented 
and helping to understand what has led to the event in this case… Because 
you know when you are involved in the event, you will be more vigilant 
because it would not happen to them a second time, but it may happen to 
many thousands of others working in the institution… Sometimes when 
staff tell the story on what we have done to make the improvements, they 
are really the strongest advocates.” 
 
Additionally, a debriefing would help identify how staff members reacted to and handled 
the event and which staff members would require additional support.  A patient safety 
officer from a small, urban, non-teaching hospital indicated: 
 
 “… depending on the event, we have a formal debrief process for some of 
the events where we can start to identify people that may be struggling.  
And it would be very helpful if we had that service available 24/7.” 
 
A director who oversees quality and risk at a small, urban, non-teaching institution also 
said: 
 
“I think a really good immediate debriefing and offer to take some time 
off to gain some distance and recoup from event and then I think an offer 
to provide short term counseling or grief counseling around the event.  
And probably an open offer to the nurse for follow up should they need it 
because they would not know if there are medium or long term effects.” 
 
Some participants mentioned that if a program was established, one of the most important 
features would be the timeliness and accessibility of the program to staff.  Most of the 
participants mentioned that a 24 hour/7 days a week service would be beneficial since 
staff would not have to wait to receive support and since many of unfortunate incidents 
happen during off hours.  A director from a large, urban, teaching hospital mentioned: 
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“What I would like to see that we don't have yet is a quick response--other 
than the immediate peers and manager, and that in off hours, the manager 
might not even be there.” 
 
 
Similarly, a risk manager emphasized the importance of available and accessible support: 
 
 
“I like the idea of real time assistance and not having to make an 
appointment.  A hotline to discuss the event without having to schedule an 
appointment to see people’s concerns.” [medium, urban, teaching hospital] 
 
Most importantly, participants emphasized the importance of establishing a just culture 
that would allow staff to access support in a non-punitive environment as well as provide 
them professional and personal reassurance.  A patient safety manager from a medium-
sized, urban, teaching hospital mentioned: 
 
“We accept the fact that as human beings, we got to make mistakes and 
humans are not perfect—the system is designed to give you what you 
designed for it to do and sometimes the system fails you. Then, we also 
tried to understand that you need to be at the table [during a root-cause-
analysis] because as the caregiver, as the person in this role, you are the 
best person to tell us how to fix it.  You are the expert at the table as well. 
So hopefully we give them that support to recognize them as professionals 
and value their opinion.” 
 
A director of quality and patient safety from a large, urban, teaching institution 
mentioned: 
 
“What we find when we do our quality of care reviews, is that staff tend to 
blame themselves a lot.  So talking through the event and hearing it will 
help them understand when events happen, it's not about them, it's about 
their processes and the processes could be improved.” 
 
A patient safety officer emphasized the importance of learning from system defects and 
communicating lessons learned while continuing to reinforce a non-punitive just culture: 
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“… And then breach that gap by providing services and education at the 
area where it happened and we also pause and look to see that the same 
opportunity is avoided across the board.  Just because it happened in one 
area, doesn't mean it can't happen in another area away from even that 
service or department.  So we communicate lessons learned…” [large, 
urban, teaching hospital] 
 
 
Many participants highlighted the importance of offering peer support.  A director who 
provides support as part of her role mentioned: 
“… [Receiving support from] people with the same discipline or someone 
who is doing the same kind of job, they understand the stressors of that 
job.  They understand you’re taking care of several patients and they’re 
busy.  There is a lot of stress involved—making sure I have the right 
medicine for the right patient.” [small, rural, non-teaching hospital] 
 
Also, another director who oversees patient safety and accreditation at a medium-sized, 
urban, non-teaching hospital said: 
 
“So for my peers to stand beside me and provide me with the support, 
where I know they don’t think I am some type of ax-murder.  That this 
was a terrible and unintentional event.  I think that’s what employees are 
looking for the most.” 
 
Another patient safety director at a small, rural, non-teaching hospital indicated: 
 
“Like any other event, I know for peer groups who go through similar 
situations, they are about one of the best support structures there are…I 
know within the last year a nurse made a med error, and there were no 
harmful effects to the patient.  It was her first error in her career.  And 
another nurse who had heard about the error came to her in the hallway 
and said, ‘I heard about the error.  I don't want you to worry.  I know you 
are a great nurse.  And I want you to know this happened to me when I 
was 3 years into my nursing career, and one thing is that you learn from it.  
I hope you learned about it, so it does not happen again.  And she helped 
her through the first several days when she was feeling really, really bad 
about herself.  Nurses are only human.” 
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A director of risk management and patient safety who works at a medium, urban, 
teaching hospital also advocated for peer support within the context of developing a 
second victim team: 
 
“…  You would get different individuals--certainly individuals who have 
been identified by the organization as patient safety champions.  I believe 




The willingness of employees to access this support would depend on the individual and 
the type of support they feel comfortable accessing.  Having the option of being 
anonymous when seeking support would also be reassuring to staff. 
 
 
III. ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT FOR PATIENT SAFETY LEADERS: 
Participants mentioned that since they were constantly being exposed to and were dealing 
with tragic events, they themselves often felt like second victims.  One participant 
mentioned: 
“… As risk managers, a lot of times we are affected by events that occur, 
even if we weren't directly involved.  As you know the nature of the 
business can be very, very stressing.  So I know that in our position that 
sometimes we have exercises or do different things for us to kind of de-
stress.” [large, urban, teaching hospital] 
 
A patient safety officer also expressed the same concern: 
 
“Who provides support to us? And we are all licensed individuals, and we 
feel the pain and the stress. We might not be the ones involved directly in 
the event or sentinel event, but we feel the stress and frustration that goes 




Serving in their administrative roles as patient safety officers, managers, directors, or 
executives, these participants indicated that they, too, would benefit from organizational 
support.  Some participants indicated that they would like to have access to a support 
program that includes similar features and services to the one they had described earlier 
for the second victim support program.  Most importantly, participants indicated that 
supporting the caregivers, having someone to talk to, getting time to reflect on the 
incident, and having executive leadership or supervisor support are support mechanisms 
that can allow them to cope with their emotions after they have been facilitating an RCA 
or managing an adverse event from an administrative role. 
 
Participants have found that one of the ways they can cope is to support the second 
victims who were directly involved in the event.  One of the reasons is that they realized 
the staff involved were more impacted by the event than someone who was listening to 
the facts of the story.  Other participants were reminded of situations when they were 
frontline care providers and felt like second victims.  One patient safety officer who also 
oversees risk management shared her experience with being a second victim: 
 
“I have been the second victim. And I had no support whatsoever... And it 
would have been very helpful if in the course of that evening, that the 
nursing supervisor had turned to me and said, ‘… this has to be very, very 
difficult. Can I get someone for you to talk with?’ It would have been 
helpful if I had given a phone number to call to talk to somebody. It would 
have been helpful if a clinical incidence stress debriefing would have been 
held within 24 hours after the event. None of that happened. Whereas I 
was there for a lot of staff who were crying and very, very distressed. And 
I was there as their support person, but no one recognized the need for me. 
I will tell you that even though it has been over 10 years since this 
incident, it still makes me cry. And I have talked about it, and I have found 
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myself afterwards. But it is a night of my nursing career that I will never 
forget.” [small, urban, non-teaching hospital] 
 
Another risk manager emphasized the importance of supporting second victims and how 
it impacts her in a positive way:  
 
“..it’s wonderful to support people because you can see that the different 
cases where we were involved that this can make or break someone's 
career.  And chances are if you don't support them, the nurse can leave the 
profession forever.” [large, urban, non-teaching hospital] 
 
 
Many participants mentioned the value of peer support.  One participant indicated that 
their team holds a peer group meeting every week to discuss difficult cases and provide 
empathetic support to each other.  A patient safety manager from a medium-sized, urban, 
teaching hospital mentioned: 
 
“A team would have been really helpful.  While I was trying to focus on 
that event, someone may be supporting me to support others.  I needed 
more because I was just as shaken up like everyone else.” 
 
A patient safety officer shared her story of how she received support from her peers and 
how it benefited her: 
 
“I talked...I talked to other nurses...  The fact that they listened, that they 
were non-judgmental... It was so tragic, and it was so sad….and they gave 
me the opportunity to cry.” [small, urban, non-teaching hospital] 
 
A patient safety director at a large, urban, teaching hospital believed that she would 
prefer to access a peer support program rather than comprehensive counseling: 
 
“Peer support because it has less stigma than going for psychiatric 
evaluation.  In my own career, I think that I might have been more 
receptive to an unknown peer than a known peer.”  
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A manager who oversees regulatory and accreditation at a large, rural, non-teaching 
hospital also mentioned the importance of talking to a peer within the hospital: 
 
“Just having a conversation with someone in the organization who could 
reassure me and listen to me.  1:1 would be most helpful with someone in 
the organization.” [medium, urban, teaching] 
 
 
Other participants mentioned that they would like to have time away from the office or 
time to reflect on the event.  A nurse manager shared her experience and said: 
 
“I think in general, health care providers we continue on and push things 
aside.  [an incident took place].. And in 24 hours we just carried on...  We 
got somewhat support, and then we carried on.  We had an EAP.  It would 
have been really nice to just stop a minute, focus on not the event…but 
just the response of how everyone was feeling.  This stayed with many 
people 5-6 years later.” [medium-sized, urban, teaching hospital] 
 
 
Similarly, a director who oversees patient safety and risk also mentioned the importance 
of peer support and having time off after the incident occurred: 
 
“… it would be nice to know that there is someone to talk to who is a safe 
person.  Or if there is a situation where I really would want to take some 
time off.  Not to be put right back into the situation that has caused the 
problem.  I would want to know that I have the support of my manager, 
my colleagues, my peers...” [large, urban, teaching hospital] 
 
Finally, many participants mentioned that they would like to receive support from 
executive leadership or from their direct supervisor.  A director who oversees nursing and 
patient safety at a medium, urban, teaching hospital said: 
 
“I would need to know that there is leadership support and that there is a 
non-punitive approach to error. And that also—for sure—an 
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organizational culture of trust.” 
 
An executive from a medium, urban, non-teaching hospital also conveyed the importance 
of leadership support: 
 
“I think it would be beneficial for my leader to approach me and offer that 
here and offer that guidance and direction.  I think the ability to 
individualize is what would be helpful.” 
 
During the interviews, some participants offered recommendations for beneficial features 
and services in a potential second victim support programs.  One executive representing a 
small, urban, non-teaching hospital said: 
 
“If [our state patient safety center] has a team of individuals and we can 
call them, and we have doctors sometimes that need assistance, they never 
take us up.  If I had a hotline number I can call for crying upset nurses and 
doctors to know exactly what to say and if they can set up follow up 
meetings, then that would be great if we didn’t have to pay.  Maybe [our 
state hospital association] can do an initial emergency intervention and 
hospitals pay for follow up…” 
 
A director of patient safety also highlighted the importance of easy access to a support 
program as well as ongoing peer support: 
 
“Teams would be multidisciplinary. People who have been employees of 
good record for a number of years would be part of it. Or people who have 
been through these types of events in the past--have past experiences. 
Ongoing support. A buddy system or something like that for a while until 
the nurse can feel that she can back down a little bit. If there was a support 
system at the individual hospital level, perhaps they could do a peer-to-
peer buddy system. Kind of like an alcoholic, like they go to AA… they 
usually have one person to call if they felt they would back slide... So 
there would be one particular nurse who would always be available and be 
there to talk to them at any time.” [small, rural, non-teaching hospital] 
 




“…  I would want something to be on site, so it is available to me when 
I'm coming to work… Of course I would want the information to be 
confidential as well.  I would like to have it so that it can be provided to 
me as an individual as well as a group of people--that would be very good.  
I think all of those things, and of course I would want a non-punitive, just 
culture approach.  And I would want those providers to know and 
understand that to help me cope with the circumstances of the situation.” 
[medium, urban, non-teaching hospital] 
 
 
IV. SECOND VICTIM SUPPORT PROGRAMS IN MARYLAND 
Participants varied in their responses when asked if their hospital offered an 
organizational support program for staff to access following adverse events.  
Approximately 70% of the hospitals did not offer a program, whereas other hospitals 
were either developing a program (13.2%) or had an existing program (15.8%): 
The following section provides an overview of the six current organizational second 
victim support programs in the state of Maryland.  [Summarize the quantitative results 
here] 
These programs are offered in seven hospitals in the state of Maryland; one of the 
programs had expanded its services in two hospitals.  (Table II) All of the programs are 
offered in urban hospitals.   Four out of the seven hospitals are categorized as large, 
teaching hospitals, whereas the remaining hospitals are small, non-teaching hospitals.  
The programs have been in existence for at least 2 years, with the most established 
program being in existence for over 10 years.  Although there are many similarities 
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across the programs, they vary in their structure as well as the mechanisms and situations 
in which support is accessed. 
 
The programs had some similarities in terms of the team members who were providing 
support.  All of the programs had social workers who supported second victims.  Clinical 
providers offering support were in 83.3% of the programs.  Approximately 66.7% of the 
programs included clergy, peers trained in providing support, and professional counselors 
or mental health professionals.  Employee assistance professionals were in 50% of the 
programs; whereas risk managers supported 33.3% of the programs.  Only one program 
had representation from the human resources department.  In contrast to the small, non-
teaching hospitals, the large, teaching hospitals included professional counselors or 
mental health professionals.  
 
Regardless of size and teaching status, all of the programs offered both group and 
individual support.  The mechanisms by which support was designed to be confidential 
differed across the programs.  All of the programs were protected when EAP 
professionals offered support.  In 83.3% of the programs, information was not shared 
with the employer when peers provided support.  The next most frequent mechanisms for 
assuring confidential were: support being adopted as part of a hospital-based Quality 
Improvement Program, protected by provider-patient relationship when a licensed 
healthcare provider was involved, and protected by attorney-client privilege with 
involvement of defense counsel.  Two of the programs were protected by work product 
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privilege through a professional liability insurer provider support program.  Additionally, 
one program was adopted as part of a Coordinated Quality Improvement Program (CQIP) 
approved by the Department of Health.  The longest standing program (>10 years) 
included all of these mechanisms to protect confidentiality.  Two programs mentioned 
additional confidentiality mechanisms. These included: data on the second victim was not 
collected, and confidentiality was not protected when immediate harm was posed to self 
or others. 
 
All of the programs received facility funding to support their programs.  Approximately 
50% of the programs were additionally supported by volunteer efforts from existing 
personnel.  In addition to receiving facility funding and support from existing staff, 
33.3% of the programs had additional sources of funding: the hospital’s EAP employee 
benefits in one case, and professional liability insurance coverage in another. 
 
The programs differed in the situations and mechanisms by which support was accessed.  
All of the programs were activated if the second victim requested support.  The second 
most frequent situation in which the program was accessed was if the risk manager or 
other leader felt it was necessary for the program to offer support.  Approximately 33.3% 
of the programs offered support when the healthcare provider was named as a defendant 
in a lawsuit.   
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The mechanisms by which support was accessed also varied across the programs.  The 
most frequent options for accessing support across the programs in each of the hospitals 
included:  self-referral (83.3%), department leader/unit manager referral (83.3%), or risk 
manager referral (83.3%).  This was followed by telephone/pager hotline (50%), 
impromptu peer referral (33.3%), and active surveillance by peers trained to look for 
distressed caregivers (33.3%).  The longest standing support program included all of 
these mechanisms for the program to be accessed and also had a second victim program 
that was accessed through a patient safety/error reporting system; the patient safety/error 
reporting system referral comprised 16.7% of the programs. 
 
Participants mentioned that there were barriers to accessing the programs at their 
hospitals.  The two most frequent barriers were taking time away from work to access the 
support and concern that the conversation between the second victim and the employee 
who provided support would not be kept confidential.  The second most frequent barrier 
was that the second victim would be concerned that their support history would be placed 
in their permanent employee record.  Other barriers mentioned included: concern that 
accepting emotional support might affect malpractice premium costs, that second victims 
might be negatively judged by colleagues, and that support will not be effective in 
meeting the second victims’ needs.  Two participants mentioned that staffs’ lack of 
awareness on the purpose of the second victim support program was a barrier.  Of the two 
programs that were offered in small, non-teaching hospitals, one identified five barriers 
and the other none. 
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When asked to provide recommendations for mitigating these barriers, the most frequent 
response was to increase awareness of the program and market program services.  The 
second was to encourage staff to access the program.  One suggestion was also to arrange 
for staff to take time away from work in order to access the program and take advantage 
of the support.  Participants also mentioned the importance of leadership in 
communicating the program’s mission and message.  Additional opportunities for 
improvement mentioned included dedicating a smaller team whose sole responsibility is 
to lead and support the second victim program.  It was suggested that it would be 
important for team members to attend debriefings and observe the root-cause-analysis 




The existing literature on second victim support programs is generally limited to 
descriptions of specific hospitals that have developed and implemented programs.  Little 
is known about what are the most effective and beneficial features that can be used in 
various settings.  In addition, the role of EAP in supporting second victims has not been 
explored previously.  Although some authors have recognized the importance of 
organizational support for second victims, there has been little exploration of supporting 




This study focused on exploring the role of EAP in supporting second victims, describing 
the features and services for an ideal support program, and assessing the need for support 
for patient safety leaders.  It also provides an overview of the existing organizational 
support programs in Maryland.  We found that although EAP services were near-
universal, they were perceived as not meeting all of the needs of health care workers.  
The effectiveness of EAP was not being evaluated, but there were several desirable 
features for an ideal system to support second victims.  There is a handful of existing 
support systems that already provide some of the desired features. 
 
Employee assistance programs were offered by all of the organizations in ours study, 
with the exception of one institution.  Participants believed that their EAPs offered 
valuable services to staff; however, they articulated that there continued to be an unmet 
need in supporting second victims.  Some of these include lack of timeliness of services, 
lack of 24 hour 7 days a week availability, inconvenient physical location of the program, 
and lack of awareness of the existence of an EAP.  These finding were consistent across 
all hospitals regardless of size, teaching status, and geographic location.  As a result, 
institutions offered supplemental resources, such as pastoral care services or a grief 
support counselors.  In addition to these access barriers, participants indicated that their 
staff were either unaware of the existence of an EAP in their hospital or thought that EAP 
services were only offered for those who are experiencing personal issues or have 
substance abuse problems that impact their job performance.  Published literature 
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indicates a lack of standardization in the training of professionals who offer support to 
employees as well as those who are leading the EAPs
143
.  Future studies could focus on 
EAP programs offered in hospital settings and ways to expand or improve their role in 
supporting second victims. 
 
All of the participants indicated that they did not receive feedback from EAP or anyone 
else about to the effectiveness of second victim services.  One possible reason is that EAP 
is structured to be confidential and is overseen by Human Resources rather than the 
hospital quality management or patient safety.  Regardless, it remains unclear how 
helpful these services are to second victims in particular.  There is a gap in the EAP 
literature on the effectiveness of EAP models and services that are offered within 
organizations, and no studies of EAP services in hospital settings
143
.  Additional studies 
should be conducted to develop and apply evaluation tools to measure the effectiveness 
of EAP.   A possible solution to the lack of data due to the confidentiality of EAP 
services might be to seek feedback from second victims themselves.  
 
Participants described several desirable features and services of an idealized 
organizational second victim support program.  The program needs to be well-advertised 
and well-articulated to staff.  Confidentiality and anonymity in seeking services should be 
communicated to staff.  This is significant as many of the staff do not currently access 
EAP services because they are either unaware of the services or are unsure of when to 
contact EAP.  Additionally, many of the participants mentioned that staff need someone 
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to talk to about the event and be easily accessible and available 24 hours, 7 days a week; 
this is critical as many events happen on the weekends or during the night shift when a 
manager is not present.  Participants emphasized the importance of peer support as an 
effective strategy to help second victims cope.  This is also consistent with other studies.  
It is essential to establishing a non-punitive, just culture within the organization where 
second victims are able to speak up.  A just culture will also allow second victims to be 
involved in identifying system defects and suggest strategies to improve the current 
process.  It will allow staff to gain professional and personal reassurance, so that they can 
continue to provide quality care.  This is consistent with other studies that emphasize the 





Interestingly, study participants saw themselves in role of second victims since they 
frequently provide support to staff, even when they were not directly involved in patient 
care.  They indicated that supporting the second victims who were directly involved in 
the event, talking to a peer, having time to reflect on the incident and how it was handled, 
and receiving support from their executive or direct supervisor were all helpful strategies 
for these participants.  This largely unreported impact has implications for expanding the 
current second victim definition.  Many of the studies on the impact of errors on 
healthcare providers focus on disclosure or supporting the caregiver as opposed to 
addressing the needs of patient safety leaders, risk managers or quality directors, who can 
also be impacted by patient adverse events. 
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Even though organizations are aware of the extent of the second victim problem in their 
institutions, very few hospitals have established second victim programs.  Currently, 
there are six programs in the state of Maryland that offer second victim support in seven 
hospitals—four in large, teaching institutions and three in small, non-teaching hospitals.  
Even though these programs vary in structure and how they are accessed by staff, they 
had common features.  Some of these include peer support, importance of confidentiality, 
offering both group and individual support, and ways in which support is accessed or 
provided.  This reflects published descriptions  of second victim programs cited in the 




.  The most frequently reported 
barriers to access and availability of services could be mitigated by further increasing 
awareness of the program and encouraging staff to access the program.  It was apparent 
that the longest standing program included a comprehensive confidentiality and designed 
the program so that it was easily accessible to staff.  There was some similarity in 
participants’ responses across the different hospital types: the large, teaching hospitals 
involved professional counselors or mental health professionals in their support program; 
whereas the small, non-teaching hospitals did not.  
 
Participants who represented organizations without support, stated that they were 
unaware of how to support second victims and how to develop and implement a formal 
second victim support structure
146
.  The implication for organizations is to either re-
evaluate the way in which their employee assistance programs provide support or to offer 
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additional support services to their staff.  Results of this study will help inform hospitals 
about the availability of support programs in Maryland and also beneficial features and 
services for the development of a potential program.  Additionally, results of this study 




This study had several limitations.  The first was that the questionnaire has not been 
validated, including both questions derived from the White survey and those newly 
developed for the project. However, the items have good face validity, and there is no 
comparable survey.  A second limitation is that a single individual generated and coded 
the interview transcripts, which may have created bias.  A third limitation is the small 
number of existing organizational support programs offered in Maryland.  However, 
these represent the universe of existing programs.  Finally, we surveyed patient safety 
officers rather than frontline providers, which may have yielded different information, 





It is apparent that there is an unmet need for organizationa0l second victim support 
programs.  In order for caregivers to provide quality and safe care, it is also important to 
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support them during and after adverse patient events.   Attention should be given to 
strengthen or establish support systems for health care workers in hospital settings, as 
some organizations have done.  This study implications for reexamining the role of EAPs 
in providing second victim support, as well as the development of more timely and 
targeted support services.  Future research should focus on second victims’ perceptions of 
organizational support after the occurrence of an adverse event.  This will assist 
researchers and organizational leaders identify the needs of second victims.  Additional 
research should address organizational culture and its impact on health care workers 
willingness to speak up and to use support services.  All of this is part of improving how 




TABLE VIII:  SECOND VICTIM SUPPORT PROGRAMS IN MARYLAND 
Second Victim Support Programs in Maryland Hospitals (n=38) n (%) 
  Existing support programs 6 (15.8) 
  Currently developing a support program 5 (13.2) 
  Not currently offering a program/ Do not know 27 (71.1) 
 
 


























































Number of Years in Existence 
  
over 10 
years 5-6 years 5-6 years  2 years 2 years 2-3 years 
over 3 
years 
Team members who provide support 
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   Clinical providers (i.e. physicians, nurses, 
psychiatrists, etc.) X     X X X X 
   Professional counselors or mental health 
professionals X       X X X 
   Social workers X X X X X X X 
   Clergy   X X X X X   
   Peers trained in providing support   X X X X X   
   Employee assistance programs (EAP)       X X X   
   Human resources or personnel office       X       
   Risk managers       X   X   
Group and/or individual support 
   Group Support X X X X X X X 
   Individual Support X X X X X X X 
Mechanisms by which support is designed to be confidential 
   Adopted as part of a Coordinated Quality 
Improvement Program (CQIP) approved by the 
Department of Health X             
   Adopted as part of a hospital-based Quality 
Improvement Program X         X X 
   Protected when provided by Employee 
Assistance Program (EAP) X X X X X X X 
   Protected by provider-patient relationship when a 
licensed healthcare provider is involved X X X     X   
   Protected by work product privilege through a 
professional liability insurer provider support 
program X X X         
   Protected by attorney-client privilege with 
involvement of defense counsel X       X X   
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   Not shared with the employer when support is 
provided by peers X X X X X X   
   Other: Data on staff member is not collected         X     
   Other: Confidentiality is not protected when 
someone poses harm to self or others             X 
Funding 
   Facility funding X X X X X X X 
   Volunteer effort from existing personnel X X X     X   
   Part of professional liability insurance coverage X             








Situations in which support is accessed & provided 
   If the caregiver requests it X X X X X X X 
   If the caregiver is named as a defendant in a 
lawsuit X X X         
   If a risk manager or other leader feels it is 
warranted X X X X   X   
   If a caregiver's responses to a screening 
instrument used to detect distress indicate that it is 
warranted X             
   If a caregiver is involved in an adverse event, 
regardless of whether or not they request support 
or appear to need it X             
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   Other: If anyone detects the need for the team to 
be called       X       
   Other: If the shift coordinator or HR requests it       X       
   Other:  If the manager requests it           X X 
Mechanisms by which support is accessed 
   Self-referral X X X X X X   
   Telephone or pager hotline X     X   X   
   Impromptu peer referral X X X         
   Active surveillance by peers trained to look for 
distressed caregivers X     X       
   Department leader or unit manager referral X X X X   X X 
   Risk manager referral X X X X X X   
   Patient safety/error reporting systems X             
 
Barriers to accessing support 
   Taking time away from work X X X     X   
   Concern that it won't be kept confidential X X X       X 
   Concern that their support history would be 
placed in their permanent record X X X         
   Concern that accepting emotional support might 
affect malpractice premium costs           X   
   Concern that they might be negatively judged by 
colleagues   X X     X   
   Belief that support will not be effective   X X         
   Don't know       X       
   Other: lack of education          X     
   Other: not knowing about the program           X   
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* Hospitals B & C share the same program 
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This chapter provides a summary of the findings from the three manuscripts, lists 
limitations of the study, and presents implications for policy and future research. 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This study was undertaken to fill a gap in the current literature on the second victim and 
support programs for health care workers traumatized by adverse patient related events.  
We also aimed to provide information on the perspective of patient safety leaders for 
hospitals in Maryland on the extent of the second victim problem in their organizations, 
and the need to develop an organizational support program.   
 
This dissertation had two main specific aims: (1) to review the literature on second 
victims, psychological trauma, and support interventions to treat second victims, and (2) 
to assess the perceptions of patient safety officers of the extent of the second victim 
problem in their organization, and the extent of support services available to second 
victims.  Specific aim 1 was addressed in the literature review section of the dissertation.  
For aim 2, we designed a mixed-methods study that included data from 38 acute care 
hospitals in the state of Maryland during a 3-month time period.  Information was 
obtained from these participants through interviews and questionnaires.  Overall, the 
findings indicate that the second victim problem is prevalent across all hospitals in the 
state, regardless of sizes, teaching status, and urban/rural status.  Given the general lack 
of evidence on how to approach this issue, this dissertation offers suggestions on 
potentially useful features of second victim programs. Findings from the literature review 





There were several important findings in the literature that addressed study aim #1.  This 
section provided an overview of the second victim literature as well as the literature on 
acute stress reaction and post-traumatic stress disorder, the management and treatment of 
psychological care, and support systems in hospital and non-hospital settings. Although 
the term ‘second victim’ was introduced approximately 14 years ago, there continues to 
be a gap in the literature on the prevalence of second victims.  The impact of 
unanticipated adverse events and trauma on second victims was described in light of 
clinical conditions (acute stress reaction and post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms) 
and stress reactions.  Additionally, the impact of errors on the healthcare team and the 
organization was also explored. 
 
The literature review described the Baldrige framework, which was used as a conceptual 
foundation to explore the aims of this study.  Another finding of the literature review is 
an overview of current support structures offered to the hospital workforce and others 
who experience psychological trauma.  First, there was a detailed description of the 
second victim programs that are offered to hospital workforce across the country.  The 
organizations that offer these programs include, Medically Induced Trauma Support 
Services, University of Missouri, Kaiser Permanente Program, Boston Children’s 
Hospital, Brigham and Women’s Hospital, and the Johns Hopkins Hospital.  Second, the 
literature review provided an overview of support programs that are offered to individuals 
who experience psychological trauma external to the hospital setting; these include 
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Psychological First Aid (PFA), Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM), and 
resilience support programs in the military.   
 
Finally, policy implications for establishing second victim support programs were also 
introduced.  The Joint Commission is currently revising its Sentinel Event Policy to 
encourage organizations to identify and address the needs of second victims.  
Additionally, the literature review also referenced the Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) “To 
Err Is Human” report as it relates to reducing patient harm and designing safer systems.  
Thus, the findings in the IOM report provide an opportunity to understand the scope of 
the second victim problem in healthcare. 
 
Manuscript #1  
The first manuscript addressed study aim #2.  The purpose of this manuscript was to 
assess the extent of the second victim problem, the availability of emotional support 
services, and the need for organizational second victim support programs among acute 
care healthcare institutions in the State of Maryland.  The most striking finding was that 
virtually all of the patient safety leaders and their executives were aware that the second 
victim problem exists in their organization.  Although participants varied in their 
perceptions of whether a second victim program would be helpful within their institution, 
all agreed that in general, hospitals should offer organizational support programs for their 
own staff that become second victims.  Regardless of efforts by organizations to promote 
a ‘just culture’ in responding to events, they reported continued stigma associated with: 
(1) speaking up during a root-cause-analysis and (2) the willingness of employees to 
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access support, even if it was offered.   This paper only addressed perceptions of need 
and how those needs were being met from the perspective of patient safety officers and 
hospital executives.  Future research should assess the need for second victim programs 
from the perspective of second victims themselves, and explore ways to overcome the 
stigma associated with accessing the support.  
 
Manuscript #2 
The second manuscript also addressed aim #2.  This study described the extent to which 
organizational second victim support is perceived as desirable by acute care hospitals in 
Maryland, and to identify existing second victim support programs.  This study was 
based on the same interview with hospital patient safety leaders.  The results indicated 
that although hospitals offered employee assistance services (EAP) to their employees, 
there was a failure to provide an effective way to measure effectiveness of these services.  
There was a perceived gap in the services that were being provided including: timeliness 
of intervention, lack of EAP staffs’ clinical experience in relating to clinical providers, 
and inconvenient physical location of EAP.  Additionally, there was an apparent need for 
peer support for both the second victim as well as for the individuals providing support to 
the second victim.   
 
A total of six second victim support programs were described that are offered in 
Maryland hospitals.  Brief descriptions of these programs were provided in this 
manuscript.  The results suggested that organizations should either re-evaluate the way in 
which their EAPs provide support or offer additional support services to their staff.  
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Future research should focus on the role of employee assistance programs in offering 
support to second victims and identifying beneficial services from existing support 
programs that might be incorporated into an ideal/standard second victim support 
program for hospitals.   
 
LIMITATIONS 
This project, and the resulting papers had several limitations.  Some of this is based on 
existing gaps in the published second victim literature.   Although a few studies 
confirmed that the prevalence of second victims, reported ranges varied from 10-50%.  
This large range was also obtained from convenient rather than representative sample of 
the larger healthcare population.  Second, literature on emotional support and debriefing 
for disaster relief workers and those in combat was used as a basis for developing the 
work at Johns Hopkins and elsewhere.  It is not clear how generalizable the effectiveness 
of recommended support strategies are likely to be for clinicians in hospitals.  Since the 
term ‘second victim’ was coined in 2000, there have been a few studies that focused on 
addressing the concept of second victims, and there have been a few institutions that have 
developed their second victim support programs and published program results.   
 
A limitation of the study itself it that it focused on obtaining perceptions of a specific 
target population—patient safety representatives in the state of Maryland, as well as peer 
responders from the Johns Hopkins Hospital RISE program.  As a result, responses to the 
interview questionnaire may not be representative of the experience and perceptions of all 
health care workers, particularly second victims themselves.   Future studies should 
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include the perspective of populations at are involved in unanticipated adverse events, 
such as second victims or even senior executives—as both groups have different 
perspectives and insights on the benefits and feasibility of second victim support 
programs.  Future studies should also be conducted in different states or countries. 
 
In addition, the findings generated from this study include a relatively small sample size, 
especially those from the evaluations by RISE peer responders, which may impact 
generalizability of the results.  Given that the interviews with patient safety officers were 
audio recorded, it is possible that there may have been a social acceptability bias, and 
respondents may have provided more positive responses in comparison to what they felt 
or experienced.  Discussions of challenges and barriers to developing a support program 
or providing support to second victims may have been limited in nature, given the 
sensitivity of expressing these concerns.  In addition, the patient safety representatives in 
the Maryland survey had various backgrounds and roles within the organization, which 
could have led to some of the variability of responses.  For instance, a range of 
participants included risk managers, patient safety officers, senior executives, and quality 
directors.   
 
An additional limitation is the lack of a validated interview questionnaire used to measure 
the prevalence of second victims and the need for developing peer support programs. 
These limitations may affect the validity of the findings from these manuscripts.  
However, they offer an opportunity to inform future research that can address the needs 
of a different target audience or setting.  Given that the questionnaires were utilized in the 
 133 
State of Maryland, future studies can focus on refining testing the reliability and validity 
of the questionnaires that were demonstrated in this study.  
 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
This study has implications for future work including public health and hospital practice, 
public health policy recommendations, and future research. 
 
A)  Public Health and Hospital Practice 
This study has implications for practice on both the system level and the level of 
individual behavior, since it focuses on strengthening health system delivery.  From the 
systems perspective, developing second victim support programs allows organizations to 
address second victim needs, so that healthcare providers are able to provide quality 
patient care.  When implemented and supported by organizational leadership, these 
programs promote and enhance a culture of safety, as they offer an opportunity for staff 
to be comfortable in speaking up and acknowledging their needs after experiencing a 
traumatic event.  It is critical for health care organization to address work environment 
factors that impact patient care, such as just culture, teamwork, and communication.  
Furthermore, encouraging second victims to identify and address system defects after an 
event has taken place will reinforce the organization’s commitment to establishing a just 
culture.  Rather than duplicating efforts in providing workforce support, second victim 
programs can collaborate with EAPs to offer the most comprehensive coping strategies 




Implementing a second victim program also has implications at the individual behavior 
level.  Second victim support programs will allow healthcare providers to address 
stressful and traumatic symptoms early on to decrease the likelihood of developing PTSD 
over time.  In accessing available organizational support, second victims will be engaged 
in understanding and acknowledging their own psychological and social support needs.  
It will also motivate them to provide appropriate peer support to their colleagues that 
experience adverse patient events.  It should also engage them to make decisions and 
change care processes to decrease the incidence of medical errors.   Importantly, an 
effective and sustainable second victim program will build trust between healthcare 
providers and organizational leadership as organizational resources are being invested to 
address second victim related issues. 
 
The Baldrige framework provided a conceptual foundation for this research study as it 
relates to both the “Leadership” and “Workforce” domains. Implementing a second 
victim program will help senior executives create an environment that cultivates 
supportive open communication among healthcare providers.  Leaders will also be able to 
instill and re-emphasize just culture and learning from system defects to improve patient 
care and patient outcomes. 
 
Focusing on the “Workforce” domain of the Baldrige framework provided an opportunity 
to assess how the second victim support structures will assist healthcare providers in 
effectively coping with their emotions.  Asking patient safety representatives on their 
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perceptions of how employee assistance programs can support providers was also a 
critical component of Baldrige’s workforce focus domain.  Overall, establishing a support 
structure for second victims will further enhance healthcare provider performance in 
offering quality care. 
 
Furthermore, the results of this study may motivate organizations to invest resources to 
develop support programs for healthcare providers to access.  In an effort to establish a 
just culture within an organization, an essential components is to encourage providers to 
speak up about system defects and the impact medical errors have on them, their team, 
and patient care.  Organization policies can protect second victims by offering 
confidential services and beneficial strategies for second victims to adopt before 
returning to work.  Additionally, organizational policies that focus on the healthcare 
provider in the workplace, such as just culture and adverse event reporting policies, can 
be expanded to include the importance of addressing second victims’ needs.  An 
additional recommendation for organizations is to require existing EAPs to collaborate 
with second victim programs to maximize the opportunity for the hospital to address 
second victim issues. 
 
B) Public Health Policy  
Since there has been growing attention to improve healthcare delivery systems and to 
handle patients and families who are harmed after a medical error, this study has 
implications for developing and implementing higher level health policies that encourage 
second victim support.  The Joint Commission’s commitment to enhancing patient safety 
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culture within organizations is evident in their revision of the Sentinel Event Policy.  The 
new policy will expand to include certain harm events to staff, visitors, or vendors that 
occur when they are in the healthcare organization.  Furthermore, including the 
acknowledgement of second victims’ needs in this policy conveys the Joint 
Commission’s commitment to supporting clinicians in a high reliability environment.  
Our findings should encourage The Joint Commission and other regulatory agencies to 
emphasize the importance of offering support to healthcare providers who are 
experiencing trauma after an unanticipated adverse event.  Perhaps a future requirement 
for accredited hospitals is to acknowledge the second victim problem, commit to 
supporting their healthcare providers and offer an organizational second victim support 
program  
 
C)  Future Research  
These findings also have implications for future research. The current gaps in the second 
victim literature offers opportunities to explore future research in quantifying the 
prevalence of second victims.  Since the term ‘second victim’ was coined in the year 
2000, only a few studies have cited the prevalence of second victims in a specific hospital 
setting.  Future research should estimate the prevalence of second victims from national 
studies that have been published, including the Institute of Medicine’s “To Err Is Human” 
Report. 
 
Additional research should focus on various target audiences in different settings.  For 
instance, future areas of research can include collecting data on second victims 
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themselves since they are the individuals who have witnessed and are closely impacted 
by the event after the patients and families.  As the end users of a second victim program, 
second victims will be more likely to be able to report on the accessibility and barriers to 
using a support program.  They will also be able to identify strengths and opportunities 
for program improvement.  Future projects should explore the perspectives of second 
victims from different professions, since physicians may have different perspectives and 
needs than nurses or pharmacists, and a currently underrepresented in the literature.   
 
Additionally, future research can include perceptions of senior leadership as their 
perspectives might be different than that of patient safety representatives and second 
victims.  Developing a second victim program requires financial and structural 
organizational resources, as well as leadership support to champion this type of work.  
Implementing a second victim program can ultimately lead to a shift in the organization’s 
culture where staff are more likely to trust the organization in supporting them following 
the occurrence of an adverse event.  Visible senior leadership commitment can also assist 
in sustaining a second victim support program after it has been implemented. 
 
Future research is needed to address influencing factors, such as organizational resources, 
priorities, culture, transparency, and funding, which may impact an organization’s 
willingness to adopt a second victim support program.  Since many of these factors can 
influence an individual’s ability to report an event and speak up, it will be beneficial to 




Furthermore, future research can focus on embedding second victim concepts and terms 
into existing patient safety infrastructure.  For instance, including a few questions in an 
organizational employee satisfaction survey or patient safety culture survey may assist in 
collecting data on second victims’ perceptions in accessing, maintaining, or evaluating 
organizational support.  Data might be collected on the following concepts: 
manager/supervisor support following an event, team support and communication 
following an event, confidence in speaking up, confidence in accessing support.  
Focusing on organizational culture, particularly creating a nonjudgmental and blame-free 
environment, is key given the stigma attached to accessing organizational support.  This 
will also reinforce leadership commitment to sustaining efforts to support second victims.   
 
Future efforts might also include linking an organizational second victim support 
program to the institution’s incident reporting system.  For instance, when an employee 
reports an event, an alert can be sent to him/her prior to submitting the event in the 
system, so that they can access the second victim support as needed.  In other instances, 
the second victim support program can be notified to reach out to staff on that particular 
unit after the event has been submitted.   
 
Future work on this issue can also focus on developing a roadmap or template for 
organizations to utilize as they consider creating their own second victim program.  This 
will help reduce the burden of developing new material or reinventing the wheel.  It will 
also allow users to effectively allocate their resources given the limitations on current 




In conclusion, there is an apparent need to develop second victim support programs to 
assist healthcare providers who are emotionally traumatized by unanticipated adverse 
events.  The two manuscripts in this dissertation have implications for organizations - to 
develop peer support program and for regulators to encourage initiatives that will allow 
organizations to prioritize the implementation of such a program.  The findings in this 
study provide a framework for organizations to acknowledge second victims’ needs and 
implement their own second victim support program. 
 
This research gives rise to a future research agenda that emphasizes the importance of 
offering organizational support programs for healthcare providers. Future research should 
focus on further developing and validating measurement tools that will assess program 
effectiveness and outcomes as well as the program’s impact on organizational culture and 
other hospital-wide patient safety indicators.  Future work should also include obtaining 
perceptions of second victims on accessing organizational support as well as developing 
an ideal support program that will address the needs of second victims, and in so doing 
improve the quality of health care. 
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